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2.1  Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed a sharp growth of friction between the 
United  States and  the  European Community  in  the realm  of  trade 
policy. In few areas has this friction been as apparent as in the growing 
volume of GATT litigation between the two parties. 
In one respect, the large number of GATT lawsuits can be viewed 
merely as a symptom of more fundamental substantive problems of the 
relationship. Increasingly, however, the litigation itself has come to be 
seen as a cause of conflict. 
The European Community has repeatedly accused the United States 
of misusing GATT legal procedures, charging that many U.S. lawsuits 
have no real legal foundation but are instead primarily political gestures 
made to satisfy domestic policy needs. The United States, in turn, has 
accused the Community of trying to subvert GATT litigation proce- 
dures-and  indeed the integrity of GATT law itself-by  resisting many 
of the suits brought by the United States. 
This paper examines US-EC GATT litigation from its inception in 
the early 1960s, until the end of  1985. The paper is divided into two 
main sections. Section 2.2 presents what is called a quantitative profile 
of  US-EC litigation: Who has  sued  whom? How often? Over what 
issues? The US-EC litigation is compared with all other GATT litigation 
that took place during the same period. 
Section 2.3 then analyzes the US-EC litigation in its historical and 
political context. It seeks to identify the factors underlying the litigation 
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behavior of the two parties, and offers a prediction of how these factors 
are likely to affect US-EC legal relations in the future. 
2.2  A Quantitative Profile 
2.2.1  The Sample 
The General Agreement  on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is an inter- 
national agreement that establishes rules of behavior for governments 
in the area of international trade policy. The General Agreement also 
contains an adjudication procedure that permits member countries to 
bring “lawsuits” about violations of those rules. Since the GATT came 
into force in 1948, over 130 such GATT lawsuits have been initiated.’ 
This section of the paper examines the 80 GATT lawsuits filed from 
1960 to the end of  1985-the  time during which the European Com- 
munity has been a full participant in GATT legal affairs.2 It focuses 
particularly on the 26 suits between the United States and the European 
Community during this period. (Appendix A presents a table listing all 
80  lawsuits; Appendix  B  contains a separate list  of  the 26  US-EC 
lawsuits.  1 
2.2.2  The Parties 
Table 2.1 lists the number of appearances that each GATT member 
has made in GATT lawsuits from 1960 to 1985, listing separately the 
number of  appearances as a defendant and as a plaintiff. Table 2.2 
provides a detailed list of exactly which other parties were suing, and 
being sued by, the five most active GATT litigants-the  EC, the United 
States, Canada, Japan, and Australia. 
The following data in tables 2.1 and 2.2 seem significant: 
1. Almost one-third of  the GATT lawsuits during this period (26 of 
80) were lawsuits between the United States and the EC. 
2. In addition to the 26 lawsuits between the U.S. and the EC, 45 of 
the remaining 54 lawsuits involved either the U.S. or the EC as one of 
the parties. Only 9 of the 80 lawsuits involved neither.3 
3. The EC and the U.S. litigated more frequently with each other 
than with others. The United  States accounted for 26 percent of the 
complaints filed against other GATT countries, but 53 percent of  the 
complaints filed against the EC. The EC accounted for only 11 percent 
of the complaints filed against others, but 56 percent of the complaints 
filed against the U.S. The same disproportionate shares appear when 
one examines the activity of the U.S. and the EC as defendants. The 
EC was the target of 30 percent of  the complaints filed by other GATT 
countries, but was the defendant in 57 percent of the U.S. complaints. 
The U.S. was the target of  only 13 percent of the complaints filed by 19  US-EC GATT Litigation 
Table 2.1  Appearances as Defendant and Plaintiff 
Defendants  Plaintiffs 
EC"  33b  U.S.  31 
U.S.  1  5c  ECd  15 
Japan  9  Canada  7 
Canada  7  Australia  6 
U.K.  3  Brazil  3 
Spain  2  Japan  2 
Greece  1  Chile  2 
Denmark  1  Hong Kong  2 
Norway  I  India  2 
New Zealand  1  Uruguay  I 
Finland  1  Israel  1 
Switzerland  1  Korea  I 
Jamaica  I 
Brazil  I 
Chile  1 
Argentina  1 
Poland  1 
Nicaragua  1 
South Africa  1 
Finland  1 
Total  78  Total  78 
Plus one case with 
10  defendants, and 
one case submitted 
jointly by the 2 
parties 
Plus one case with 
15 plaintiffs, and 
one case submitted 
jointly by the 2 
parties 
"Includes complaints both against the EC and against member states: 
EC itself  27 
France  3 
Italy  1 
Belgium  1 
Netherlands  1 
b17 by  U.S. 
c8 by  EC. 
dThere were no separate complaints by individual EC member states. 
others, but 53 percent of the EC complaints were brought against the 
United States. 
4. The US-EC litigation is not distinctive in terms of  each party's 
role as plaintiff and defendant. The United States sued the EC twice 
as often as the EC sued in return (17 to 8), but the United States also 
sued other GATT countries twice as often as it was sued by them (14 
to 7).  The EC likewise  played  the same defendant-oriented  role  in 
GATT litigation with other countries, suing other GATT members less 
than half as often as it was sued by them (7 to 16). 
5. With or without the EC, the United States was responsible for 
initiating a very large share of the GATT lawsuits during this period. 
It accounted for 40 percent of  all complaints since 1961, with the EC 20  Robert E. Hudec 
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"Total includes one case submitted jointly by the U.S. and the EC. 
a distant second at 21 percent. Excluding all lawsuits between the U.S. 
and the EC, the United States still accounted for a 26 percent of the 
rest, with Canada next at  13 percent. 
6. With or without the US., the European Community has been the 
target of  a very large share of the lawsuits during this period. The EC 
or a member state has been the defendant in 42 percent of  the GATT 
lawsuits  since  1961, with the  United  States a distant  second  at 20 
percent. Excluding suits between the EC and U.S.,  the EC was the 21  US-EC GATT Litigation 
defendant in 30 percent of the remaining cases, with Japan next at 17 
percent. 
Summing up, it would seem that the United States and the European 
Community each had a rather pronounced legal tendency-legal  ag- 
gressiveness in  one case, and legal  vulnerability  in  the other.  It is 
perhaps no surprise, therefore, that the two parties litigated with dis- 
proportionate frequency when dealing with each other. 
2.2.3  The Volume of Litigation over Time 
Table 2.3 presents a year-by-year breakdown of GATT lawsuit ac- 
tivity since 1960. The total number of all  GATT lawsuits filed in the 
year is given in the first column of numbers. The following six columns 
give a breakdown of the litigation  activity  of the United  States and 
European Community during each of those years. 
When GATT litigation is viewed over time, the following significant 
patterns emerge: 
Table 2.3  GATT Lawsuits, by  Year 
All  U.S.  U.S.  All  EC  EC 
Year  Cases  U.S.  All  EC  EC  All  U.S. 







































































Total  80  1.5  31  17  33  1.5  8 
aThe 1963 case was the joint US-EC submission known as the “Chicken  War.” 22  Robert E. Hudec 
1. The volume of US-EC litigation has been increasing, but so has 
the volume of  GATT litigation in general. There were only 3 US-EC 
lawsuits in the 1960s, followed by 9 in the 1970s, and then  14 in the 
six years 1980-85.  Other GATT litigation followed roughly the same 
rising curve-3  in the  1960s, 23  in the  1970s and 28 in the six years 
2. The unequal distribution of plaintiff and defendant roles noted in 
the previous section occurred mainly in the period before 1980. In that 
period, the U.S. filed nine complaints against the EC while the EC filed 
only two in return. The same imbalance occurred, for both the U.S. 
and the EC, in their litigation against other GATT members during this 
period.  In the years  before  1980, the  U.S.  enjoyed a  1O:l  plaintiff/ 
defendant ratio while the EC suffered a rather galling 1:8 ratio. 
3. Since 1980, the plaintiff/defendant ratios of both the U.S. and the 
EC have become more balanced. The ratio in US-EC litigation in the 
1980s has been only 8:6 in favor of the United States. In GATT litigation 
against other countries, the U.S. ratio has actually fallen into deficit 
(4:6), while the EC ratio has risen to an almost equal balance (6:8). 
4. The single most striking change in the years after 1980 has been 
the emergence of the EC as a GATT plaintiff. Having filed only 3 GATT 
lawsuits in the years  1960-80,  the EC filed  11 lawsuits in the years 
1980-85. 
1981 -85. 
2.2.4  Subject Matter 
Having examined which GATT countries  were  suing which  other 
countries and when, we now turn to the question of what they were 
fighting about. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present two sorts of data pertaining 
to the subject matter of these lawsuits. 
Table 2.4 presents a breakdown of disputes according to the product 
area affected by the trade policy measure in q~estion.~  Disputes are 
divided into three broad categories: (1) complaints about measures that 
affect trade in agricultural and fishery products; (2) complaints about 
measures that affect trade in industrial and mining products; (3) com- 
plaints about trade measures of  a general character that have, in the 
case at hand, no particular product focus or effect. 
The significant data in table 2.4 appear to be the following: 
1. Of  all the GATT lawsuits from  1960 to  1985, 54 percent of the 
complaints (43 of 80) involved trade in agricultural products. 
2. The European Community has been the target of 58 percent of all 
lawsuits involving agricultural products (25 out of 43). 
3. The percentage of agricultural complaints in litigation against the 
EC is twice as high as the percentage in litigation against other GATT 
countries. Litigation against other GATT countries involves agricultural 
trade measures only 38 percent of the time. Litigation against the EC, 23  US-EC GATT Litigation 
Table 2.4  Subject Matter, by Product Area 
Grouping 
of Casesa 
Agricultural  Industrial 
& Fishery  & Mining  General 
No.  %  No.  %  No.  % 
All Cases (80)  43  54  27  34  10  13 
All  v. EC (33)  24  73  5  15  4  12 
U.S. v. EC (17)  13  76  1  6  3  18 
Other v.  EC (16)  11  69  4  25  1  6 
All v.  U.S. (15)  6  40  6  40  3  20 
EC v.  U.S. (8)  3  38  3  38  2  25 
Other v.  U.S. (7)  3  43  3  43  I  14 
All v. Other (30)  12  40  16  53  2  7 
EC v.  Other (7)  2  25  4  63  1  12 
U.S. v. Other(l4)  6  43  7  50  I  7 
Other v.  Other (9)  3  33  6  67  0  0 
-  -  -  -  Unclassified (2)  2  100 
“The term  “Other”  in the Grouping of  Cases column means all other litigants except 
the EC and/or the U.S. 
on the other hand, involves complaints about agricultural trade in 73 
percent of the cases. 
4. Lawsuits over agricultural trade measures are clearly the reason 
why the EC is the GATT’s most frequent defendant. In disputes not 
involving agricultural products, the EC has been sued no more often 
than the U.S.-nine  times each. 
5. The volume of  “agriculture”  lawsuits against the EC is not due 
to any peculiarity of US-EC litigation. Other governments accounted 
for 44 percent of the agriculture lawsuits against the EC  (1 1 of 25), and 
agriculture complaints represented an almost equally high percentage 
of their total complaints against the EC as did the agricultural com- 
plaints of the United  States49  percent to 77 percent. Everyone, it 
seems, had special problems with EC agriculture. 
In sum, table 2.4 points the finger for most of the EC’s litigation 
problems at agricultural policy-meaning,  of course, the EC’s Common 
Agricultural  Policy  (CAP).  The data also  show that  the  litigation- 
generating effect of the CAP is general, and not merely a peculiar U.S. 
reaction. 
Table 2.5 presents a breakdown according to the type of trade policy 
measure being complained about.5 Disputes are divided according to 
three basic types of policy  measure: (1) complaints about subsidies, 24  Robert E. Hudec 
including both export subsidies and domestic production subsidies; (2) 
complaints about tariffs, including EC variable levies; (3) complaints 
about nontariff barriers, including both border measures and internal 
measures, and both quantitative and tax-type measures. 
Table 2.5  also contains a final column that examines the extent to 
which discrimination has been a ground of complaint. Since trade bar- 
riers involving discrimination  will already have been  counted in  the 
Tariff and Nontariff Barrier categories, the Discrimination category is 
separated from the other totals by being presented in parentheses in 
the column to the far right. 
The data in table 2.5  is less striking, but the following points may 
be noted: 
1. Subsidies accounted for an important share of litigation against 
the EC (13 of 33 complaints-39  percent), but were only a negligible 
factor in the lawsuits against other GATT members during this period 
(3 of 45 complaints-7  percent). Of the 13 subsidy complaints against 
the EC, 10 involved agriculture.6 
2. Subsidy complaints were an even larger share of  U.S. complaints 
against the EC-8  of 17, or 47 percent. 
3.  The importance of  subsidies led  to further analysis of  subject 
matter which revealed another phenomenon that cannot be shown on 
Table 2.5  Subject Matter, by Policy Measure 
Trade Barriers 
Grouping  Discriminatory 
of Cases  Subsidies  Tariff  Nontariff  Elementa 
No.  %  No.  %  No.  %  No.  % 
All Cases (78Ib  16  21  12  15  50  64  (18  29) 
All  v. EC (33)  13  39  3  9  17  51  ( 6  30) 
U.S.  v.  EC (17)  8  47  I  6  8  47  .  (  I  11) 
Other v.  EC (16)  5  31  2  13  9  56  ( 5  45) 
All  v.  U.S. (15)  2  13  3  20  10  67  ( 5  38) 
EC v.  U.S. (8)  2  25  2  25  4  50  (  1  17) 
0  0  1  14  6  86  ( 4  57)  Other v. U.S. (7) 
All v.  Other (29)  1  3  6  21  22  76  (  7  25) 
U.S.  v. Other(l4)  1  7  2  14  I1  79  (  4  30) 
EC v. Other (29)  0  0  2  33  4  67  (0  0) 
Other v. Other (9)  0  0  2  22  7  77  (  3  33) 
-  -  -  Joint Submission  -  -  I  100  - 
“The number and  percentage of  “Trade  Barrier”  complaints containing a clear leagl 
attack on a discriminatory element. 
hT~o  cases (1, 68) could not be classified by type of measure. 25  US-EC GATT Litigation 
table  2.5. The United  States suffered  almost exactly the same per- 
centage of complaints as did the EC (6 of  16, or 38 percent) against 
what might be called antisubsidy measures.  Four complaints against 
the United States involved legal objections to some aspect of the U.S. 
countervailing duty  law.’  A fifth complaint  involved  a U.S.  export 
subsidy on sales of wheat flour to Egypt, an act of retaliation against 
the EC wheat flour subsidy.8 And finally, a sixth complaint involved a 
U.S. corporate income tax law called DISC, an export subsidy  justified 
in part as a response to alleged export subsidies built into the “terri- 
torial” income tax systems of other co~ntries.~  It would seem, in short, 
that the U.S. response to subsidies caused as much irritation in other 
capitals as subsidies were causing in Washington. 
4.  Antisubsidy measures were the target of an even larger percentage 
of EC complaints against the U.S.-4  of 8, or 50 percent. 
5. The fact that 51 out of 64 trade barriers complained about during 
this period were nontariff trade barriers is not unexpected. After the 
1967 Kennedy Round tariff cuts, tariff levels have fallen so low that 
they are rarely used anymore as instruments of trade policy. The rel- 
ative proportion of tariff and nontariff litigation between the U.S. and 
the EC is not out of the ordinary. 
6. The number of discrimination cases is perhaps a bit lower than 
one might have expected, but not much. Many observers, the author 
included, have remarked on the declining respect for the MFN principle 
over the past 20 years. Evidently, however, governments have not been 
overly preoccupied with the problem. The total of  18 out of  62 trade 
barrier complaints-a bit over one quarter-is  not an insignificant share, 
but neither is it very large. 
7. Discrimination  is almost nonexistent as a factor in the US-EC 
litigation. In only 2 of the 26 lawsuits between them was discrimination 
a major issue.’O This is particularly  surprising in  view of  the rather 
extensive discrimination practiced by the EC against the United States. 
Trade policy officials often call attention to the fact that, of all GATT 
countries, only the United States, Japan, Australia and New Zealand 
pay the full rates of the EC Common External Tariff anymore. Maybe 
so, but it does not seem to be bothering them very much. 
8. Interestingly, 12 of the  17  discrimination complaints were made 
by  “other”  GATT countries.  This tends to confirm the view  often 
expressed in developed countries that discrimination is more dangerous 
for smaller countries than for the larger ones. At least smaller countries 
seem to react to it more vigorously when they end up on the wrong 
side. 
Of these various findings pertaining to the type of policy measure at 
issue, the only ones of any real significance to the US-EC legal rela- 
tionship are the first four. The number one substantive issue in GATT 
litigation between the U.S. and the EC has been subsidies and measures 26  Robert E. Hudec 
responding to subsidies. These subsidy-related matters have been more 
prominent in US-EC litigation than in GATT litigation generally. 
2.3  US-EC Litigation in Context 
2.3.1 
Several threads run through the history of  US-EC litigation  from 
1960 to 1985. The timing of the U.S. lawsuits is quite closely related 
to events in Congress, with a majority of the lawsuits occurring either 
just before the Congress was to vote on new trade legislation, or seem- 
ingly in response to demands made by the Congress when passing such 
legislation.  The timing of  EC lawsuits,  in  turn, seems most closely 
related to the volume and vigor of U.S.  lawsuits, with an increase in 
EC lawsuits following each major increase in U.S. litigation. The one 
substantive issue that seemed to dominate litigation strategy on all sides 
was the ever-present EC Common Agricultural Policy. 
Legal Actions in the 1960s 
The 1960s opened with a lawsuit by Uruguay that produced a sig- 
nificant challenge to the Common Agricultural Policy. The first phase 
of the lawsuit was directed to all developed countries, including the 
member states of the EC, attacking any and all trade restrictions against 
Uruguayan exports. Uruguay then added a second set of issues by 
asking for a legal ruling on the conformity of the EC's Common Ag- 
ricultural Policy (CAP) with GATT, and on the conformity of the vari- 
able levy in particular.  The GATT panel hearing the complaint twice 
declined to rule on this second set of issues, saying that the contracting 
parties had considered the variable levy before and had been unable 
to come to a decision." 
Had the United States wished to challenge the legality of  the CAP 
in toto, this would have been a good opportunity. Apparently, however, 
the United States was not willing to do so. There is no evidence that 
the United States gave any support to Uruguay's request for a ruling. 
The first GATT legal complaints by the United States in the 1960s 
were a pair of  1962  complaints against  France and Italy,  attacking 
quantitative restrictions that were being maintained, without legal ex- 
cuse, on products for which France and Italy had granted Dillon Round 
tariff concessions.  IZ The two complaints were the first GATT lawsuits 
filed by the U.S.  in six years. They appear to have been intended to 
demonstrate the U.S. administration's resolve in enforcing trade agree- 
ment rights, for both were filed just at the time when the U.S. Congress 
was considering major trade legislation that became the Trade Expan- 
sion Act of 1962. 
A Brief History of US-EC Litigation 27  US-EC GATT Litigation 
The two 1962 complaints also had the secondary purpose of warning 
the European Community against further expansion of its Common 
Agricultural Policy. The primary focus in both suits were restrictions 
affecting processed food such as canned fruits-products  that had not 
been included in the original variable levy system and for which GATT 
tariff bindings were still in force. The United States apparently wanted 
to demonstrate that it had no intention of surrendering its GATT rights 
on such products. 
The complaint against Italy  was  settled  at an early  stage with a 
promise of  liberalization on certain products. The French complaint 
could not be settled immediately, and so the United States asked for 
a panel decision ruling on its rights. A generally favorable ruling was 
made, but the panel asked the United  States to defer its request for 
authority to retaliate pending another round of negotiations. The case 
was then settled with a promise by France of partial libera1i~ation.I~ 
The next major legal event of the 1960s was the celebrated “Chicken 
War”  dispute.I4 The European Community had withdrawn all GATT 
tariff bindings on variable levy products. This was legally permitted, 
but the Community was required to pay compensation, in the form of 
tariff concessions on other products, for the legal rights being taken 
back. If  other governments did not regard the compensation offered 
as adequate, they were free to restore the balance in  their own way 
by withdrawing an equivalent number of their own concessions. 
The Chicken War arose when the United States declined to accept 
the compensation offered for withdrawing the West German binding on 
poultry, and announced it would retaliate by withdrawing concessions 
of its own on $44 million worth of EC trade. The European Community 
contested the size of  the retaliation, and this collateral dispute was 
submitted to a GATT panel. The United States then retaliated by with- 
drawing  concessions  of  the  amount  determined  by  the panel-$26 
million. 
The real purpose of the Chicken War retaliation was to give a dra- 
matic expression of U.S. displeasure with the level of protection adopted 
in the CAP on poultry.  One can never be certain what impact  such 
retaliation  has had, because one cannot know what would have hap- 
pened without it. From all visible signs, however, the retaliation had 
no effect at all. The European  Community went about finishing the 
CAP and  setting its  support prices  much  as before,  with  levels  of 
protection uniformly higher than the United States thought appropriate. 
For the rest of the 1960s, US-EC legal relations remained quiet. This 
was part of a general lull in GATT legal affairs, for there were no GATT 
lawsuits of any kind during the years 1964-69.  During these years, the 
United States directed its concerns about the CAP to the negotiating 
arena. It made a determined effort during the Kennedy Round to secure 28  Robert E.  Hudec 
some kind of legal ceiling on the level of  protection in the CAP, re- 
peatedly threatening to end the negotiations if  such limits were  not 
included. In the end, however, the United States did agree to go ahead 
with the industrial tariff cuts in the Kennedy Round, having received 
nothing more than a fig leaf in agriculture-the  short-lived 1967 Inter- 
national Wheat Agreement. 
Legal Actions in the 1970s 
In the early 1970s, the United States brought a flurry of new GATT 
lawsuits. This new legal assault was intended partly as a foundation 
for another major piece of trade legislation-the  Trade Act of  1974. 
But it was also a genuine effort to restore the effectiveness of GATT 
adjudication procedures by giving them work to do. 
U.S. legal relations with the European Community took a bad turn 
early in the 1970s with a rather long skirmish over EC tariff preferences 
on citrus products in favor of Mediterranean suppliers.I5 The United 
States repeatedly protested the illegality of such preferences, but never 
formally demanded a legal ruling. The matter was eventually settled in 
1973 with an agreement adjusting the seasonal tariff rates in a manner 
favorable to U.S. exporters. (It was about this time that U.S. and EC 
leaders reached a broad political agreement, known as the Casey-Soames 
agreement, in which the United  States agreed to accept the general 
principle of EC preferential arrangements with the states of Africa and 
the Mediterranean.) 
The first formal legal complaints against the European Community 
were two lawsuits filed in 1972. One involved temporary “compensa- 
tory  taxes”  that the European Community had placed on imported 
agricultural products to adjust for the effects of the monetary disturb- 
ances of the time.16  The measures were acknowledged to violate GATT 
tariff bindings,  and the Community promised  prompt removal  when 
conditions permitted. The United States repeatedly demanded a formal 
legal ruling, but the Community managed to delay GATT legal pro- 
ceedings until the tax had been almost completely withdrawn, and the 
United States then agreed to drop the matter. 
The other 1972 lawsuit was a renewal of the 1962 complaint against 
France.I7 The United States reopened the case by filing a formal request 
for authorization to retaliate, charging that France had not yet removed 
all of the quantitative restrictions found in violation.  The retaliation 
proceeding was  averted at the eleventh  hour by  an undertaking  to 
remove the remaining restrictions. 
The U.S. legal campaign evidently caused some irritation in Brussels, 
and it may also have raised some concern about the possibility of  still 
further legal attacks upon EC policy. Prior to 1973, the European Com- 
munity had responded to such ‘‘legalistic’’  forays by lecturing the United 29  US-EC GATT Litigation 
States on the folly of seeking legal solutions to foreign trade problems. 
In  1973, however, the Community took up the legal sword itself. For 
the first time in its history, it filed a GATT lawsuit, charging that the 
newly enacted U.S. DISC law constituted a subsidy to U.S. export- 
ers.I8 While it is impossible to document the suspicion, most GATT 
observers believed that the Community had filed the lawsuit primarily 
because it believed that U.S.  legal attacks were getting out of hand, 
and that the United States needed a lesson in legal humility. 
The United States was not chastened. It responded by filing three 
counterclaims against the Community-lawsuits  against France, Bel- 
gium, and the Netherlands charging that the “territoriality”  feature of 
their income tax systems had the same economic effects as DISC; if 
DISC was an export subsidy, said the United States, so were those tax 
laws.I9 The United States insisted that the four complaints be adjudi- 
cated as an ensemble by a single GATT panel; it also demanded that 
the panel include outside tax experts skilled enough to understand the 
issues of tax theory raised by  the U.S.  legal position. Thus began a 
long and tortured proceeding that did not end until 1981. 
The  United  States  took  a  fairly  severe  public  relations  beating 
throughout the history of the DISC cases. Everything the United States 
did was regarded as wrong by the majority of GATT countries. The 
U.S. legal position never had any support; DISC was a blatant subsidy, 
while territorial systems of income taxation were something that vir- 
tually every GATT government had employed since long before GATT 
existed.*O  The techniques used by the United States to support its legal 
claim were  likewise roundly  criticized.  In the  view  of  most  GATT 
countries, the U.S. insistence on linkage of the cases was totally im- 
proper.  The insistence on special experts was also much criticized, 
and, though it was not the only cause of delay (the Community itself 
delayed for long periods), it certainly did add to the delay substantially. 
The U.S. isolation continued after the panel finally reported in 1976. 
Although the panel reports found all four defendants equally guilty, 
most other governments agreed that the findings against the EC coun- 
tries were in error and that only the DISC finding was correct. Standing 
alone, the United States insisted that all four findings must rise or fall 
together and persisted in this position for five years. In 1981, the United 
States finally accepted the majority view and agreed to a vaguely worded 
decision that was understood  by  everyone to set aside the adverse 
rulings on the French, Belgian, and Netherlands tax systems but not 
the ruling on DISC.  In  1984, the  United  States repealed DISC and 
replaced it with a superficially more conforming law. 
If the purpose of the DISC case had been to show up the less-than- 
perfect quality of  U.S. legal compliance, it could hardly have worked 
better. But, however embarrassing the DISC case proved to be, it did 30  Robert E. Hudec 
not  slow  the  U.S.  campaign  to  revive  GATT  dispute  settlement 
procedures. 
Part of the reason may have been a new factor that entered the picture 
shortly after the DISC case began. In 1974, the United States executive 
branch went to the U.S. Congress to obtain new negotiating authority 
for the Tokyo Round trade negotiations. One of the conditions Congress 
added was a new procedure, known as section 301, that was designed 
to compel the U.S. executive branch to enforce U.S. legal rights more 
vigorously than it had in the past.21  Congress was no longer satisfied 
with a few demonstration lawsuits on the eve of each major trade law. 
It was now demanding a permanent, institutionalized permanent pro- 
cedure that would create and maintain continual pressure for enforce- 
ment. Congress made clear that legislative approval of the Tokyo Round 
agreements would depend on a satisfactory record in the years ahead. 
The pressures generated by section 301 proceedings  yielded seven 
GATT lawsuits by  the United  States during the years of the Tokyo 
Round negotiations (1975-79)-three  against Japan, two against the 
European Community, and one each against Canada and Spain.22  Both 
complaints against the Community were filed in  1976. Both involved 
short-term trade measures in the agricultural sector, taken to alleviate 
surplus situations in product sectors benefitting from CAP price sup- 
ports. One case involved a minimum-import-price regime for imported 
tomato products, and the other involved a mixing regulation requiring 
the use of  surplus dairy products with imported animal feeds.*3 Sig- 
nificantly, the imported products being restricted in  both cases were 
once again products on which GATT tariff bindings had remained in 
effect. In both cases, the restrictive measures were withdrawn before 
the GATT panel proceedings could be completed, but in both cases the 
proceedings  were carried out to a formal decision anyway, and both 
measures were found in violation. The GATT panel agreed with the 
U.S. position that a formal legal ruling of illegality was appropriate in 
order to deter similar “hit-and-run”  measures in the future. 
In  1978, not long after the two 1976 complaints were decided, the 
European Community  filed  its  second GATT  complaint  against  the 
United States. It was a curious lawsuit. The United States had a quite 
strict countervailing duty law that had been partially suspended during 
the Tokyo Round negotiations in order not to prejudice  negotiations 
for a new Subsidies Code. The suspension had expired before the end 
of the negotiations, and a crowded legislative calendar had delayed the 
U.S. Congress in passing a new law to extend it. As a consequence of 
the delay, several suspended investigations  were  suddenly in  danger 
of triggering countervailing duties. In what appeared to be a warning 
of dire consequences if the suspension were not quickly renewed, the 
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of countervailing duties would constitute a nullification and impairment 
of GATT benefits under Article XXIII.24 The legal grounds of the EC 
complaint were dubious because the U.S. law was pretty clearly cov- 
ered by a reservation for pre- 1947 mandatory legislation and had been 
used often before. The tone of the complaint was nonetheless quite 
demanding. 
The threatening tenor of the EC’s Article XXIII action introduced 
a new type of  Community  legal  response that was to be seen fairly 
frequently in the coming years-a  quick, sharp, and rather belligerent 
threat of retaliation, often listing the actual products.25 Governments 
often make such threats for the purpose of providing tangible evidence 
of  harm for friendly officials in the other government. On other oc- 
casions, such threats are understood as demonstrations to satisfy in- 
terests back home. But there is a thin line between such showcase 
threats and plain old-fashioned muscular diplomacy, and it was often 
difficult to tell which side of the line the EC was standing on. In either 
case, the Community was emerging from the defensive legal posture 
of its early years.26 
Legal Actions in the 1980s 
In 1979, the U.S. Congress passed major legislation approving and 
implementing all the trade agreements negotiated in the Tokyo Round. 
The price of its approval was a promise from the Executive Branch 
that there would be even more vigorous enforcement of GATT legal 
rights in the future. 
To  make sure that the promise was kept, Congress strengthened 
section 301 still further by increasing its scope, its retaliation authority, 
and its a~tomaticity.~’  Congress also made it clear that it now wished 
to become a permanent partner in the business of trade policy,  with 
the relevant congressional committees exercising more or less constant 
oversight over day-to-day affairs. Needless to say, enforcement of GATT 
legal rights would be a central focus of that oversight. The message of 
the 1979 legislation amounted to a demand for some quick GATT legal 
victories  to prove the value  of the legal  rights gained in  the Tokyo 
Round. 
The climate within GATT had also become more conducive to liti- 
gation by this time. The pressure from the United  States lawsuits in 
the early  1970s had brought about a general increase of government 
interest in GATT litigation.  The Tokyo Round negotiations  were fol- 
lowed up by the devoting of considerable time and effort to improving 
the GATT’s litigation machinery. The results were significant-an  ex- 
tensive restatement of the Article XXIII panel procedure2*  and a series 
of  new  and more rigorous  panel  procedures for most of  the Tokyo 
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began to increase noticeably after about 1977. Although most of the 
initial increase was litigation other than US-EC lawsuits, it was inev- 
itable that these forces would eventually have an impact upon the US- 
EC legal relationship as well. 
Nothing very exciting happened during the first few years following 
the Tokyo Round. The United States  initiated a legal proceeding against 
the Community in 1980 to challenge a new United Kingdom regulation 
on poultry  processing that required foreign  suppliers to comply two 
years earlier than domestic suppliers.30 Although the new regulation 
seemed clearly in violation of both GATT Article 111 and the new Tokyo 
Round Standards Code, the United States eventually allowed the com- 
plaint  to lapse when  U.S.  exporters reported that they had already 
learned to comply and were no longer concerned. 
The European Community responded with a 1981 complaint charging 
that the United States  had impaired GATT tariff concessions on  Vitamin 
B-12, because of the way in which it had converted the tariff to a new 
valuation basis.31 A GATT panel found that, although the U.S. mode 
of implementation had caused severe adverse trade effects, the method 
of tariff conversion had not been in violation of U.S.  obligations. But 
the panel’s report then went on to muddy the legal waters by suggesting 
that the United  States should  nonetheless  modify  its tariff  anyway, 
voluntarily. The United States refused to comply with this suggestion, 
and the Community chose to regard U.S. inaction as a failure to abide 
by GATT obligations. The dispute still smolders.32 
The relative legal quiet of these first years was deceptive because 
during this time a number of  legal grievances against the European 
Community were working their way through U.S. internal procedures 
in Washington. Finally, in late 1981 the storm broke. Between Decem- 
ber 1981 and July  1982, the United States filed seven GATT lawsuits 
against the European Community.  Five concerned subsidies on agri- 
cultural products, one involved a renewal of the 1970-73  complaint 
about preferential tariffs on citrus products, and one involved an in- 
dustrial trade problem-whether  the EC’s Value Added Tax (VAT) should 
be counted in calculating the price threshold for transactions subject 
to the new Tokyo Round Procurement Code. The seven complaints 
were: 
Export Subsidy on Wheat Flour (Subsidies Code) 
Export Subsidy on Pasta (Subsidies Code) 
Export Subsidy on Poultry (Subsidies Code) 
Production Subsidy on Canned Fruit and Raisins (Art. XXIII) 
Export Subsidy on Sugar (Subsidies Code) 
Preferential Tariff on Citrus Products (Art. XXIII) 
Treatment of VAT in Price Calculations (Procurement Code)33 33  US-EC GATT Litigation 
The sugar complaint was not pursued, and the poultry complaint evolved 
into a slow-moving series of  discussions between the U.S., the EC, 
and Brazil. The other five complaints were pressed quite hard, resulting 
in long and often bitterly contested proceedings that eventually pro- 
duced legal rulings by a GATT panel. 
The legal claims in all five of the contested cases called for changes 
in EC policy that ranged from extremely difficult to politically impos- 
sible. The legal claims in the three agricultural subsidy cases attacked 
critical aspects of the CAP.  The wheat flour case sought to establish 
legal limits on the amounts of CAP surplus production that could be 
disposed of  via  subsidized exports-limits  that would  have created 
impossible surplus disposal problems if the EC were to continue price 
supports, without production limits, at the high levels that had been 
considered politically necessary in the past. The pasta complaint sought 
to prevent,  or at least seriously  hinder, the Community from giving 
subsidies on exports of processed foods, a result that would have vir- 
tually destroyed the export markets of many EC food processors who, 
under the CAP, were being forced to pay  extremely high prices for 
their raw  materials. The canned fruit complaint  would have caused 
similar effects on food processors selling within the EC market, for the 
complaint sought to bar subsidies to domestic producers for products 
whose EC tariff had been  “bound”  in previous GATT negotiations. 
This would have meant that local processors would have had to pay 
the full CAP prices for raw materials and then compete, without tariff 
protection, against imports made from raw materials at world prices. 
The legal claims in the citrus and VAT  cases were of similar pro- 
portions. The citrus complaint attacked preferential tariff advantages 
that were a key economic incentive holding Mediterranean countries 
inside the European political orbit. The VAT complaint made demands 
on the EC’s own procurement policy which the EC insisted were im- 
possible to meet. 
All five of the panel decisions fell short of  satisfactory resolution. 
The VAT decision was accepted but still appears to face great difficulty 
being implemented. In the other four cases, the panel  reports were 
rejected by one of the parties and thus never became official GATT 
rulings.34 The wheat  flour panel  was unable  to reach a decision on 
whether EC wheat flour exports had exceeded the “equitable share” 
standard of Subsidies Code Article 10. The United States attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to override the panel report by persuading the full Com- 
mittee  of  Subsidies Code  signatories to make a finding of  violation 
itself, and when this failed the U.S.  blocked adoption of the panel’s 
no-decision report. The panel in the pasta case issued a 4-1  divided 
report in which the majority found that the export subsidy on pasta 
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supported by several other governments, refused to permit adoption 
of the majority report. Both the canned fruit and citrus panels rendered 
unanimous rulings that the EC measures in question constituted non- 
violation nullification and impairment under GATT Article XXIII, but 
the EC blocked adoption of both these reports as well. 
At the close of  1985, the net outcome of  the five U.S.  complaints 
remained unclear. The VAT complaint was alive, unsettled, and under 
discussion. There were some more positive signs of movement in the 
four other cases. The legal  complaint  in  the wheat flour  complaint 
seemed quite dead, but the EC was heard to claim that it was limiting 
its wheat and wheat flour exports to a specified percentage of the world 
marked (14 percent)-an  assertion that sounded a good deal like a claim 
of compliance with some new “equitable  share” standard (defined by 
the EC).35 The canned fruit complaint appears to have been  settled, 
without adoption of the panel report, on the basis of the EC’s agreement 
to eliminate that part of the production  subsidy which exceeded the 
difference between CAP prices and world prices for raw materials. The 
impasse of the citrus case caused the United States to retaliate unilat- 
erally on pasta products (thereby snatching a bit of relief for the pasta 
case as well), but this action was then met by a counterretaliation from 
the EC.36  As the year ended, both parties claimed to be making progress 
toward a negotiated solution that would settle both the citrus and pasta 
cases at the same time. 
The years from  1981 to the end of  1985  found the United  States 
occupied  with  carrying out the litigation  started in  1981-82.  These 
drawn out legal battles seem to have satisfied whatever political needs 
for GATT litigation the U.S. government might have had during this 
period. Following the 1981 -82 complaints, the United States filed only 
one new GATT complaint up to the end of 1985, and that one was only 
a reopening of  an earlier 1978 cornplaint against Japan.37 
The European Community, however, was not too busy to respond. 
Between March 1983 and the end of 1985, the Community took seven 
legal actions against the United States-five  conventional GATT law- 
suits and two instances of  retaliation. The five lawsuits were: 
Import Restrictions on Printed Matter-the  “Manufacturing Clause” 
Subsidy on Exports of Wheat Flour to Egypt (Subsidies Code) 
Tariff Reclassification of Machine-Threshed Tobacco (Art. XXIII) 
Ban on Steel Pipe and Tube Imports (Art. XXIII) 
Countervailing Duty Action on Wine (Subsidies C0de)3~ 
(Art. XXIII) 
The two retaliation actions were a 1984 action exercising compensation 
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on specialty steels,39 and the action mentioned  above in response to 
unilateral retaliation by the United States in the Citrus case.4o 
Of the five GATT lawsuits filed by the European Community, three 
led to no decision. The pipe and tube case became moot, and the Egypt 
wheat flour and machine-threshed tobacco cases have not been pros- 
ecuted. The wine case also became moot when the law expired without 
having produced any new restrictions, but the EC nonetheless obtained 
a panel ruling that the law in question was inconsistent with the Sub- 
sidies Code. (Later, the United States would block acceptance of this 
ruling in retaliation for EC blockage of the several earlier panel rulings 
favorable to the U.S.). The Manufacturing Clause complaint also pro- 
duced a panel ruling that the U.S. law was in violation of GATT, and 
here the Community followed up the decision by making a product- 
specific threat of retaliation if the U.S. Congress extended the law past 
its scheduled expiration in June 1986. (The law was later allowed to 
expire.) 
In addition to these specific legal actions, the European Community 
made what appeared to be a major change of legal policy in 1984 when 
it  adopted a  procedure modeled  after the infamous  (in Community 
terms, anyway) U.S.  section 301  pr~cedure.~’  The new  procedure, 
called the New Commercial Policy Instrument, permits private citizens 
to complain about GATT violations of other countries, and establishes 
a series of  steps that could  well  force EC officials to respond with 
GATT complaints about such matters, in  much the same fashion as 
section 301  does. 
As the curtain comes down on the first 25 years of US-EC litigation, 
the final scene shows neither party in retreat from the legal wars of 
the early 1980s. Both the European Community and the United States 
remain clad in full legal armor, both seemingly prepared and waiting 
for bigger and better GATT litigation in the years to come. The Com- 
munity’s New Commercial Policy Instrument is reportedly about to 
yield its first GATT complaint.42 Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress con- 
tinues to grind out legislative proposals for stronger and stronger GATT 
enforcement procedures, and the executive branch has created a “strike 
force” looking for new GATT violations and a “war chest”  to help 
induce discipline in subsidy matters.43 
Both sides have agreed that the GATT dispute settlement is a problem 
that should be included on the agenda of any forthcoming round of 
GATT trade negotiations.  From what has been seen so far, however, 
it is not at all certain that they have the same “problem”  in mind. 
2.3.2  The Underlying Reasons for US-EC Litigation 
What  explanation can be given for the explosion  of  difficult  and 
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does the experience mean about the likely course of  future legal re- 
lations between the United States and the European Community? Will 
the United States continue to follow the aggressive litigation practices 
it has followed in the past? And what legal policy will the European 
Community follow in the years ahead? 
The present  section examines the factors behind the litigation just 
described, with an eye to answering these questions about the future. 
The Experience of  the United States 
The one lesson that emerges most clearly from the history of  the 
past 25 years is that GATT litigation has come to play an important 
role in maintaining political support for liberal trade policy in the United 
States. Throughout this period, the U.S. Congress has been willing to 
enact legislation authorizing trade negotiations and to resist most pro- 
tectionist initiatives, but on each occasion the price for such liberal 
policies has been progressively more rigorous undertakings to enforce 
GATT obligations against other governments. The political importance 
of such enforcement mechanisms has reached the point where, in 1985, 
virtually every piece of new trade legislation introduced in Congress 
has contained some provision calling for more vigorous GATT enforce- 
ment  .44 
The political importance of enforcing GATT legal rights grows out 
of the public character of  trade policy politics in the United States. 
Unlike  arcane monetary  policy  issues, which  are little  understood, 
trade policy issues have a direct impact that is perceived by  almost 
everyone. As a consequence, political leaders are held rather strictly 
accountable for what they do on trade policy matters. Leaders need 
little further  justification for supporting protectionist positions, but they 
do need to justify support for liberal trade policies. The two concepts 
that  work  best  as justifications  in  United  States  politics  are  “rec- 
iprocity”  and “fair trade.”  Neither of these concepts ranks very high 
on the scale of economic rationality, but both have proved their effec- 
tiveness politically many times over. GATT legal enforcement happens 
to be an effective way for U.S. officials to demonstrate, in a politically 
credible manner, the existence of both reciprocity and fairness. 
The reciprocity justification is simple. To explain why foreign pro- 
ducers should be given trade opportunities in the U.S. market, political 
leaders must show that similar opportunities have been given to U.S. 
producers in foreign markets. The first step is to show that promises 
of equal access have been obtained from other governments. The sec- 
ond step is to show that such promises are actually being carried out. 
This second step has become a difficult hurdle in U.S. politics. Fact 
and myth have combined to create a fairly widespread belief that the 
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in trade  negotiations-in  order to maintain  good  political  relations. 
GATT litigation is frequently used to answer these doubts. Although 
one or two lawsuits hardly proves anything about a government’s at- 
titude toward the hundreds of other enforcement issues that arise each 
year, they are nonetheless a useful symbol to back up declarations of 
good intentions. They give the executive branch something tangible to 
show to Congress and, perhaps more important, something tangible 
for Congress to show to its constituents. 
The importance of GATT lawsuits in demonstrating reciprocity has 
grown considerably in the past two decades due to the increasing im- 
portance of nontariff barriers in world trade. Nontariff barriers cannot 
be traded for one another the way that tariffs can. There is no common 
measure, for example, by which to trade the relaxing of  an unduly 
restrictive safety standard on baseball bats for limiting the scope of an 
overly broad countervailing duty law. The only credible form of rec- 
iprocity in nontariff barrier negotiations is the reciprocity that comes 
from each country’s adherence to the same set of  legal obligations 
pertaining to each nontariff barrier. Such rule-compliance reciprocity 
is difficult to demonstrate, however, because  most  nontariff  barrier 
rules consist of prohibitions, and it is always difficult to demonstrate 
that a government is not doing something. Lawsuits tend to meet this 
problem by providing a tangible sort of evidence that a rule-enforcement 
mechanism does exist, and that the mechanism is working-at  least 
this once. 
In addition to providing a reciprocity justification, political leaders 
in the United States have also found it increasingly necessary to dem- 
onstrate that trade liberalization will take place only with respect to 
“fair”  trade, and that U.S. producers will be protected from compe- 
tition with various kinds of “unfair”  trade. The primary source of such 
assurances has been the enactment of laws that stop unfair trade at the 
border, such as antidumping, antisubsidy, and similar anti-unfair trade 
remedies. In recent years, however, effective GATT regulation of sub- 
sidies has also been demanded, particularly as a political quid pro quo 
for curbing the excess rigor of the U.S. countervailing duty law. This 
is the reason for U.S. insistence on the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, 
and for the fact, noted in section 2.2 of this paper, that subsidies have 
played such an important role in the history of GATT litigation to date. 
The political  role  served by GATT litigation in the United  States 
explains the general litigiousness of  the United States during this pe- 
riod. More must be said, however, about the large number of  legal 
claims against the EC, and in particular the rash of  legal claims that 
precipitated the litigation impasse in the early 1980s. 
The data in section 2.2 showed that the European Community was 
the most frequent defendant in  U.S.  lawsuits, and that measures af- 38  Robert E. Hudec 
fecting agricultural trade were at issue in the great majority of these 
cases. In one  respect, this was a perfectly understandable choice. Given 
a political need to litigate against trade barriers in order to demonstrate 
reciprocity, the EC’s Common Agricultural Policy was an obvious tar- 
get. Although the CAP was certainly not the only trade distortion in 
the world, it had three characteristics that made it politically the most 
visible: (1) it was large; (2) it involved agric~lture;~~  and (3) it was new. 
Novelty was perhaps the most important characteristic, for the loss of 
something currently possessed is always the loss most keenly felt. The 
CAP presented a new threat to a wide range of existing and potential 
U.S. export markets-both  markets inside the EC and third-country 
markets where surpluses created by the CAP were likely to be disposed 
of. 
As politically  irritating  as the CAP was,  however,  it  was not  so 
completely damaging to U.S. interests that the U.S. government was 
prepared to  risk a trade war over it, Many U.S.  officials were persuaded 
by EC arguments that the CAP was the only cement that could hold 
the European Community together.  For those who believed that the 
existence of a healthy  European Community was of paramount im- 
portance to the long term security interests of the United States, ac- 
ceptance of the CAP was thus a geopolitical necessity. Moreover, many 
sectors  of the U.S.  economy were benefittingfrom trade and investment 
opportunities created by the formation of the Community, and these 
sectors were also a political  force of  some importance opposed to 
risking trade war for the sake of lost agricultural exports. There were 
even some important agricultural interests on this side, for the CAP 
did not close all markets to exporters of  U.S. agricultural products. 
United States agricultural exports to the Community actually grew, in 
round numbers, from $1 billion in 1960 to over $9 billion in 1980; these 
exports gave the United States a substantial export surplus in its ag- 
ricultural trade with the Community throughout the period.46 
The U.S. legal attacks on the CAP during this period can be under- 
stood only when viewed in terms of these opposing U.S. interests. The 
GATT lawsuits must be viewed, not as a simple attack on the CAP, but 
rather as an attempt to steer a middle course between the conflicting 
U.S. interests on this problem. The U.S. government was required to 
act vigorously  in  defending  the agricultural  interests injured  by  the 
CAP, for failure to do so would have been seen as a failure to protect 
U.S. reciprocity interests, and this would have caused a serious loss 
of political  support for the liberal orientation of U.S. trade policy.  If 
the U.S. government pressed too hard, however, it  could very well 
damage the many other important economic and geopolitical interests 
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it would become clear that these latter interests were decidedly the 
stronger. 
GATT litigation provided the sort of compromise policy instrument 
that was needed in this situation. GATT lawsuits could achieve some 
positive results for the threatened U.S. interests. Legal pressure could 
in fact accomplish something: It could sometimes deter protectionist 
extensions of the CAP that were not essential to its basic operations. 
Indeed, on occasion GATT lawsuits might even be able to induce some 
self-restraint on larger issues by creating “events”  that would focus 
pressure of all kinds on the problem in question. Most of  the GATT 
litigation in  question was in fact a good faith effort to make use of 
GATT legal forces in this manner. 
But-and  this is the critical point-lawsuits  were essentially a soft 
response. Despite their aggressive tenor, lawsuits themselves are just 
words; they merely threaten hostile action, putting off the actual im- 
plementation until the final decision is made, usually  a year or two 
after the lawsuit is filed. Consequently, even on issues where the EC 
was unwilling to move at all, GATT lawsuits were a good way to buy 
time. They were aggressive enough to satisfy the political need for a 
reciprocity-protecting action, and yet did involve actual warfare. In 
other words, it would often make sense to file even a hopeless GATT 
lawsuit, because it would allow the U.S. government to avoid, for a 
while at least, the possibly damaging political reactions of  those do- 
mestic interests who were going to be disappointed. 
This second part of the process may well have been the most valuable 
in terms of maintaining an open and liberal trade policy relationship 
between the United  States and the EC. If  a fully grown CAP,  1985 
edition, had been presented to U.S. agricultural interests in  1961, the 
shock would probably have been too great to permit maintenance of 
normal trade relations. As it happened, of course, the CAP was revealed 
only in stages. Its economic effects could thus be accepted in smaller 
bites, each time with an assurance that this was as far as the United 
States would go. GATT lawsuits helped to convey such an assurance 
in a politically credible manner. In some instances, such delaying effects 
would solve the problem by themselves, for time alone can sometimes 
lead injured parties to accept their losses and to lose interest in further 
complaints. But even where the hurt persisted, the delays would serve 
to put off the day of reckoning for a while, thereby allowing normal 
relations to continue in the meanwhile. 
The U.S. GATT litigation during this period can be viewed in terms 
of this contain-and-retreat strategy. The first line of containment, once 
the U.S. government had accepted the basic design of CAP and its 
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Community to limit the level of the variable levy, to keep support prices 
down, and to use production controls to manage supply. This was the 
objective of the Chicken War retaliation  and of  the Kennedy Round 
negotiating efforts. When this approach failed, U.S. officials drew two 
other “lines in the sand” to assure U.S. interests that the CAP would 
not be allowed to expand beyond the variable levy regimes protecting 
the European market. The second line of containment would be U.S. 
insistence upon preserving GATT bindings and other GATT disciplines 
on those products not covered by variable levy regimes (chiefly certain 
animal feeds and certain processed products). The third line would be 
insistence the effects of the CAP be limited to the EC market itself, so 
that they would not distort third-country export markets. 
The effort to hold the second line was evident in many of the GATT 
lawsuits challenging EC measures inconsistent with GATT bindings 
and obligations. A number of relatively small legal victories during the 
1970s permitted U.S. officials to claim that the line was being held. In 
the case of  animal feeds, this  was generally  true, for exports rose 
throughout the period. For processed products, there were problems. 
Given the very high primary product prices created by the CAP, it was 
unrealistic to expect that the EC would agree not to assist food pro- 
cessors disadvantaged by those abnormal raw material costs. Conse- 
quently, when the issue was finally forced directly, in the canned fruit 
and pasta lawsuits of 1982, the U.S. legal claims were almost guaranteed 
to produce an impasse. And, of course, they did. By the end of  1985, 
it looked as though the United States was prepared to make a partial 
retreat, at least to the extent of accepting EC assistance to food pro- 
cessors that reduced raw material costs to world price levels. 
The third line of containment, the defense of third-country markets 
against the subsidized export of EC surpluses, was initially to be held 
by  GATT Article XVI:3 obligations on export subsidies. When  EC 
export subsidies began to run wild in the early 1970s, the effort shifted 
to negotiating new and stronger legal prohibitions against export sub- 
sidies in the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code. Once again, of course, the 
idea of containing CAP surplus disposal without containing prices and 
production was wishful thinking. This became quite apparent in the 
late 1970s, when the EC indicated that it was unwilling to accept any 
new discipline in the Subsidies Code, and, indeed, was not even willing 
to sign the rather weak Subsidies Code it had helped to draft without 
first obtaining a private assurance of benign U.S. intentions (the not- 
so-secret Strauss/Gundelach letter).47  The EC’s unwillingness to limit 
its export subsidies was driven home in 1978 when the EC successfully 
“stonewalled”  a pair of  rather strong legal claims by Australia and 
Brazil challenging CAP export subsidies on sugar under the old Article 
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United  States officials  continued  to claim,  nevertheless, that the 
Subsidies Code had  improved  GATT discipline over the CAP.  This 
somewhat dubious claim of success no doubt seemed justified by the 
political situation at the time, for without some show of “reciprocity” 
in the new Subsidies Code the U.S.  Congress would  not have been 
able to  justify legislation implementing the many important trade agree- 
ments negotiated in the Tokyo Round, including much-needed reforms 
in the U.S. countervailing duty statute. Eventually, however, the claim 
of legal containment had to be demonstrated. The 1981-82 GATT law- 
suits were the effort to provide that demonstration. Some U.S. officials 
may actually have believed that the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code had 
created workable new obligations. Others may have known better but 
were hoping  that litigation  could somehow achieve what the Tokyo 
Round had not. But even if there had been no hope at all, the lawsuits 
would have been necessary. 
In the actual context, the flurry of U.S. GATT lawsuits in 1981-82 
can be viewed  as a rather moderate action.  The Tokyo Round  had 
created expectations of changes in EC policy that had not occurred. 
The economic harms being caused by the CAP were growing, partic- 
ularly  in  U.S.  export markets in  third countries. The situation  had 
produced strong  political pressure for some kind of vigorous response- 
something more than another round of tea-and-cookies diplomacy. GATT 
lawsuits were a response vigorous enough to satisfy the call for action, 
but still short of real economic  warfare. They did not solve the problem, 
but they did buy more time. 
Unfortunately, by the end of 1985 the process of accommodating the 
conflicting U.S.  attitudes towards the CAP had not yet played  itself 
out, and so it is not possible to know whether the role played by GATT 
litigation will ultimately be a positive one. It may be that the promises 
of legal enforcement used to buy time in the short run will turn out to 
have exacerbated the reaction in the long run when it becomes clear 
that legal containment has not occurred. If so, the eventual reaction 
against the CAP may be more violent  than it would  otherwise have 
been. 
On the other hand, there are signs that the process of gradual ac- 
commodation may still be working. Even though most of the key law- 
suits  themselves have  ended in  legal  impasse,  they  have  produced 
changes in some aspects of  CAP policy.  So far, these changes have 
involved relatively  small adjustments that in no way alter the basic 
course of the CAP. But the final settlements may turn out to be just 
meaningful enough to keep alive the idea that GATT law, used together 
with other instruments of diplomatic pressure, can impose limits worth 
having. Moreover, there is another round of negotiations in the offing, 
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of new agreements and new legal reforms to bolster claims of better 
enforcement in the future. It is still quite possible, therefore, that more 
lines-in-the-sand will be drawn, that a few more interests on the U.S. 
side will  learn to live  with  disappointed expectations, and that the 
process of adjusting to the CAP will continue along much the same 
path as before. 
Up to this point, therefore, the balance sheet on US-EC GATT lit- 
igation does not appear to be as unfavorable as the world has been led 
to believe.  The effects of any litigation have to be appraised against 
the background of  realistic alternatives. Given a setting in which the 
EC’s implementation of the CAP was causing major economic harms 
to U.S. export interests, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, until 
now, the U.S.  lawsuits probably have bought more peace than war.49 
The  issue for the future will be whether the procedure can retain enough 
political credibility to continue performing this function. 
The Experience of  the European Community 
Almost as remarkable as the United States’ litigiousness during these 
years was the European Community’s reluctance to become an active 
litigant. Throughout the 1970s, the Community seemed willing to sub- 
mit to a rather considerable number of legal  complaints without re- 
sponding in kind, not only complaints from the United States but from 
other GATT governments as well. The DISC case was one instance of 
legal retaliation,  but there were few others. Great powers do  not usually 
accept such legal mistreatment so quietly. 
The Community explained its reluctance to litigate in terms of its 
basic approach to GATT and to international  economic relations  in 
general. Time and again the EC would lecture the United States and 
others on the theme that diplomacy  was the best means to conduct 
trade relations.  Lawsuits, the Community would argue, do not solve 
the economic and social problems at the root of most trade problems. 
The U.S.  attempt to “legalize”  GATT was, sad to say, merely the 
warped thinking of  a naive and lawyer-ridden society. 
It happened, however,  that this antilegalism also suited the EC’s 
particular legal situation at the time. Although the EC’s architects had 
done a reasonably good job of conforming to GATT rules, there were 
still several aspects of EC policy that did not fit comfortably within 
those rules. The Common Agricultural Policy had potential problems, 
both in the area of subsidies and with respect to the many consequential 
measures that might be needed to adjust for the impact of the CAP in 
peripheral  product areas. In addition, a  series of  discriminatory  ar- 
rangements with countries of Africa and the Mediterranean raised se- 
rious problems of compliance with GATT’s MFN obligation. And finally, 
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to include new members, and also arranged economic relations with 
the countries of Europe who were not members.  It was, in  short, a 
time when a major realignment of European trade relationships was in 
process, and thus not a time when the Community wanted to encourage 
attention to legal obligations that defined the old order. 
If one accepts this analysis of the reasons for EC legal policy in the 
1970s, the next question to ask is what has happened to that policy in 
the 1980s. Were the EC lawsuits of the 1980s  just an outburst of irritation 
not  likely to be repeated? Or were they  a more  deliberate  strategy 
designed to dampen the litigation ardor of the United States and other 
GATT legalists? Or, perchance, has the EC policy changed in some 
more fundamental way? Is it possible that the EC has begun to believe 
in the efficacy of GATT law? 
For the present, it is probably wisest to remain rather skeptical about 
the possibility of any fundamental change in legal policy. Although the 
Community’s early policy  of  antilegalism was  certainly convenient, 
that does not mean it lacked conviction. To  the contrary, it rested on 
longstanding traditions of economic diplomacy that will probably  be 
very slow to change. 
In addition, although the European Community may no longer suffer 
from the exceptional number of GATT legal problems it once had,s0 
the Community still has more to fear from international legal obligations 
than do most other GATT members. The Community is  a hothouse 
institution created by treaty rather than a sovereign nation-state. As a 
consequence, its internal powers are more exposed to charges of legal 
irregularity than is true of most other GATT members. International 
obligations tend to have greater legal effects internally, and once such 
obligations are found applicable it is much more difficult for Community 
organs to change them. The first few court decisions on GATT have 
indicated that at least some GATT norms do not have the kind of legal 
status that is needed to become fully binding obligations within the 
EC’s internal  law.  But EC jurisprudence has not yet pronounced its 
final word on this subject. Some legal scholars are currently arguing 
that GATT law should be given a much higher place-that  it should be 
considered binding on Community institutions as a way of making them 
conform to the original economic policy goals of the Rome Treaty.s’ 
Anything that made GATT obligations more definitive might well en- 
courage developments in this radical direction. Consequently, as long 
as the status of GATT within EC law is at all unsettled, it is to be 
expected that the political leadership of the Community will do nothing 
that would augment the legal status of GATT itself. 
If this is a correct analysis of Community legal objectives, what can 
be the reason for the Community’s vigorous legal activities in the 1980s? 
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been a more vigorous form of defense against the more vigorous U.S. 
litigation policies of the early 1980s. In the terminology of the sport of 
boxing, the EC lawsuits would be called counterpunching. This reactive 
and defensive character seemed particularly clear in a recent US-EC 
exchange on legal policy in December 1985. Commissioner for External 
Relations Willy de Clerq presented U.  S. Trade Representative Clayton 
Yeutter with a “very long and technical”  list of  U.S. trade practice 
that the EC Commission considered “unfair.”  According to news re- 
ports, the list had been prepared partially in response to a similar list 
of EC legal sins issued by the United States a few months earlier. A 
statement issued by Commissioner de Clerq explained that his own list 
was meant to show that “the United States does not have a prerogative 
on fair trade.” News reports also quoted de Clerq as saying, “I under- 
lined to Mr. Yeutter the Community view that it is necessary that the 
notion of fair trade be applied in the same manner on both sides of the 
Atlantic.’’sz 
It is doubtful that the EC’s counterpunching strategy will reduce the 
volume of US.  litigation very much. The analysis of  U.S. policy in 
the previous section argues that U.S. GATT litigation is not the product 
of fuzzy legalistic thinking,  but that it is rather a response to basic 
political needs in the conduct of U.S. trade policy. Counterpunching 
will not make those political needs go away. The most likely outcome 
in the near future, therefore, is that the United  States will  continue 
punching, and the Community will continue counterpunching, and to- 
gether the two of them will continue to generate a substantial quantity 
of GATT litigation. 
Some Thoughts about the Future 
The analysis in this paper suggests that the United  States and the 
EC are likely to continue to engage in frequent GATT litigation, but 
with neither side having its heart in quite the right place. The United 
States will often be litigating for the purpose of meeting certain political 
needs back home, and the Community will be litigating primarily for 
defensive purposes, without really believing in the process. 
The analysis suggests that these not-quite-real  lawsuits may  have 
been less irritating to US-EC trade relations than is commonly  sup- 
posed.  To  the contrary, it appears that  such lawsuits may well have 
been providing a peaceful alternative to real economic warfare.  But 
there are clearly serious problems on the horizon. 
There is certainly reason to wonder whether, in view of the current 
state of legal impasse, GATT litigation can continue to retain its political 
credibility. It would be premature, however, to sign a death certificate. 
Despite the impasse to date, it may yet be possible to achieve certain 
meaningful results.  In addition, GATT governments appear ready to 45  US-EC GATT Litigation 
undertake further efforts to make GATT law work better, with a great 
deal of official optimism that improvements can be made. The optimism 
is significant. Political leaders’ belief in the possibility of further GATT 
legal reform  seems to be as durable  as their  belief  in  the value of 
‘‘reciprocity’’-and  for the same reason. Whether or not the belief is 
true, believing leads to better outcomes than not believing. 
The other serious danger in the present situation is that the use (or 
misuse) of GATT legal procedures in these not-quite-real lawsuits will 
damage the long-term development of GATT law. Here again, however, 
the situation also has some brighter possibilities. The failures of US- 
EC litigation during the past decade have already stimulated a number 
of procedural reforms that have made GATT litigation work better, in 
routine cases, than it did ten years ago. The need to keep GATT liti- 
gation credible will probably cause the strengthening process to con- 
tinue. It is possible, therefore, that the well-functioning side of GATT 
law will be able to continue building on its already impressive record, 
and that one day governments will  wake up to find that they  have 
created a stronger legal institution in spite of themselves. 
Appendix A 
GATT Litigation,  1960-1 985 
There is no official classification of GATT “lawsuits” nor have scholars 
adopted any common definition. In this paper, the author uses the term 
to denote any GATT proceeding in which one GATT member has at- 
tempted to obtain an authoritative legal ruling that another member’s 
action is either (1) in violation of GATT law or (2) has “impaired”  the 
value of  GATT rights (a special kind of  GATT legal claim). The term 
is limited to legal claims against  specified governments; it does not 
include requests for more general kinds of legal rulings. It includes all 
cases in  which the complaining government  began  a lawsuit on the 
public record-i.e.,  took at least the first step in pursuit of such a legal 
ruling in a formal GATT proceeding or document. 
The list of lawsuits in this Appendix is based in part on data published 
in Hudec (1975, 227-96)  and in part on the author’s subsequent re- 
search, as yet unpublished except for a brief synopsis of the 1975-79 
data in Hudec (1980, 200-203).  This paper has reworked some of the 
previously published data, including a few cases not found in the earlier 
research and excluding several cases which, upon reexamination, could 
not be called a lawsuit under the criteria used here. 
Each entry in the Appendix presents a rather concise view of the 
lawsuit in  question.  The top line records the defendant, then  a title 46  Robert E. Hudec 
describing the measure complained of, then the plaintiff, and finally 
the date of the first public complaint. The bottom line contains a pair 
of symbols describing the author’s classification of the case according 
to two categories-the  product sector affected by the trade measure 
complained of, and the nature of the trade measure itself. The symbol 
before the slash records the product sector: 
A  = Agricultural and Fisheries 
I  = Industrial 
G = General 
T  = Tariff 
T -  D 
NT  = Nontariff Measure 
NT -  D = Discriminatory Nontariff Measure 
S  = Subsidy 
The symbol after the slash records the type of measure: 
= Discriminatory Tariff 
The classifications describe the primary focus of the case, and do not 
mean that other elements may not have been present. 
Defendant  Title 
1.  Fifteen  “Recourse to Article XXIII” 
developed  (effect of 562 restrictions on 
countries  Uruguayan exports; request 
and EC  for ruling on variable levies) 
[A / not classified] 
2.  U.K.  Tariff preference on bananas 
3.  France  Residual BOP restrictions 
4.  Italy  Residual BOP restrictions 
5. Canada  Antidumping duty on 
[A I T-D] 
[A 1  NTI 
[A 1 NTI 
potatoes 
[A 1 NTI 
6.  [EC/US]  Joint submission: Trade 
value of U.S.  withdrawal 
rights to compensate for EC 
withdrawal of poultry 
concessions 
[A 1 TI 
7. Greece  Tariff preferences to USSR 
(on 30 industrial products) 
[I / T-D] 
[A 1 NTI 
8.  EC  Import restrictions on apples 
Complainant  Date 
Uruguay  1961 
Brazil  1961 
U.S.  1962 
U.S.  I962 
U.S.  I962 
[EC/US]  1963 
U.S.  1970 
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Defendant  Title  Complainant  Date 
9.  Denmark 
10.  Jamaica 
II. EC 
12.  U.K. 
13.  France 
14.  U.K 
15.  U.S. 
16.  France 
17.  Belgium 
18.  Netherlands 
19.  EC 
20.  Japan 
2  1.  Canada 
22.  EC 
23.  EC 
24.  EC 
25.  Canada 
26.  U.S. 
Quota restrictions on grain  U.S.  I970 
[A 1 NTI 
Excessive margins of  U.S.  1970 
preference 
Compensatory taxes on  U.S. 
[G I T-D] 
imports 
Import restrictions on  Israel 
textiles 
[A 1 NTI 
I1  1 NTI 
Import restrictions (proposal 
for retaliation in complaint 
no. 3) 
[A 1 NTI 
Quotas on dollar area 
imports 
[A I NT-D] 
DISC tax legislation 
Income tax practices 
Income tax practices 
Income tax practices 
Adequacy of Article XXIV:6 
compensation 
Import restrictions of beef 
Import quotas on eggs 
Minimum import prices, etc. 
Minimum import prices, etc. 
(same as complaint no. 22) 
Mixing requirement for 
imports of animal feed 
Article XXVIII:3 retaliation 
IG 1 Sl 
IG 1 Sl 
[G 1 Sl 
IG 1 Sl 
[A 1 TI 
[A 1 NTI 
[A 1 NTI 
IA  1 NTI 
[A I NT] 
[I 1 TI 
Ruling on definition of 
subsidy (Zenith case) 
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Defendant  Title  Complainant  Date 
30.  Norway 
31.  Japan 
32.  EC 
33.  EC 
34.  U.S. 
35.  EC 
36.  Japan 
37.  Spain 
38. Japan 
39.  U.S. 
40.  Spain 
41.  EC 
42. Japan 
43.  EC 
27. Japan  Import restrictions on 
thrown silk 
[I 1 NT-D] 
28.  EC  Export subsidies on malted 
barley 
[A 1 Sl 
29.  EC  Discriminatory import 
restrictions on TVs 
[I I NT-D] 
Discriminatory import 
restrictions on textiles 
[I I NT-D] 
Import restrictions on 
leather 
[I 1 NTI 
[A 1 Sl 
[A 1 Sl 
[G  1 NTI 
Export subsidies on sugar 
Export subsidies on sugar 
Countervailing duty actions 
Discriminatory import 
restrictions on apples 
Import restrictions on 
leather 
Restrictions on domestic sale 
of soybean oil 
Restraints on import and 
sale of manufactured tobacco 
Import prohibition on tuna 
Discriminatory tariff 
treatment of  coffee 
[A I T-D] 
Discriminatory import 
restrictions on beef 
[A I NT-D] 
[I 1 NTI 
[A 1 NTI 
[I 1 NT1 
[I I NT-D] 
[A I T-D] 
Import restrictions on 
leather 
[I 1 NTI 
Internal restraints on imports 
of poultry (Spin Chill case) 
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Defendant  Title  Complainant  Date 
44.  U.S.  Discriminatory application of  India  I980 
injury test in CVD cases 
[I I NT-Dl 
45.  U.S.  Import duty on vitamin B-12  EC  1981 
[I 1 TI 
46.  EC  Production subsidies on  Australia  1981 
canned fruit 
[A I  Sl 
41.  U.S.  $337 restraints on imports of  Canada  1981 
automobile spring assemblies 
[I 1 NTI 
48.  EC 
49.  EC 
50.  EC 
51.  EC 
52.  EC 
53.  Canada 
54.  EC 
55. EC 
56.  EC 
Export subsidy on wheat 
flour (Subsidies Code 
complaint) 
[A I S1 
Import restrictions on 
watches, radios, etc. 
Export subsidy on pasta 
(Subsidies Code complaint) 
Export subsidy on poultry 
(Subsidies Code complaint) 
[I I NT-Dl 
[A I S1 
[A I S1 
Production subsidy on 
canned fruit and raisins 
Restrictions on imports in 
Foreign Investment Review 
Act 
Export subsidy on sugar 
(Subsidies Code complaint) 
Sugar regime (export 
subsidy) 
[A 1 Sl 
t1 I m1 
[A 1 Sl 
[A 1 Sl 
Falklands War embargo 
[G I  NT-D] 
U.S.  1981 
Hong Kong  1981 
U.S.  1982 





U.S.  1982 
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Defendant  Title  Complainant  Date 
57.  EC  Preferential tariff on citrus  U.S.  1982 
[A I T-D] 
58.  EC  Treatment of VAT  in price  U.S.  1982 
calculations (Procurement 
Code complaint) 
[I 1 NTI 
59.  Brazil  Export subsidy on poultry  U.S.  1982 
(Subsidies Code complaint) 
[A 1 Sl 
60. Japan  Internal regulations on  U.S. 
softball bats (Standards Code 
complaint) 
[I 1 NTI 
61. Finland  Internal regulations on  EC 
footwear 
[I 1 NTI 
62.  Switzerland  Article XIX measures on  EC 
table grapes 
[A 1 TI 
63.  U.S.  Denial of MFN tariff 
treatment 
[G I T-D] 
64.  EC 
65. Japan 
66.  U.S. 
67.  U.S. 
68. Japan 
69.  U.S. 
70.  U.S. 
Restraints on imports of 
VTRs 
[I 1 NTI 
Import restrictions on 
leather (revival of complaint 
no. 31) 
Import restrictions on 
printed matter 
(“Manufacturing Clause”) 
Export subsidy on wheat 
flour sales to Egypt 
(Subsidies Code complaint) 
Nullification and impairment 
of benefits in general 
[G I not classified] 
Discriminatory import 
restrictions on sugar 
Tariff reclassification of 
machine-threshed tobacco 
[I  1 NTI 
[I 1 NTI 
[A 1 Sl 
[A I NT-D] 











EC  1983 
EC  I983 
Nicaragua  1983 
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Defendant  Title  Complainant  Date 
7  I. Canada 
72.  EC 
73.  Chile 
74.  Canada 
75.  New Zealand 
76.  EC 
77.  U.S. 
78.  Canada 
79.  U.S. 
80.  U.S. 
Antidumping investigation of  EC 
electrical generators from 
Italy (Antidumping Code 
complaint) 
Import restrictions on 
newsprint 
Measures on dairy imports 
Internal tax on gold coins 
Antidumping duties on 
electric transformers 
[I 1 NTI 
[I 1 NTI 
[A I NT] 
[I 1 NTI 
[I 1 NTI 
Operation of beef and veal 
regime 
Ban on steel pipe and tube 
imports 
[A 1 wl 
[I I NT-D] 
Internal regulations on 
alcoholic beverages 
Import restrictions on 
products containing sugar 
Countervailing duty action 
on wine (Subsidies Code 
complaint) 
[I 1 NTI 
[A 1 Wl 




Canada  1984 
EC  1984 
South  1984 
Africa 
Finland  1984 
Australia  1984 
EC  1984 
EC  1985 
1985 
1985 52  Robert E. Hudec 
Appendix B 
US-EC GATT Litigation, 1960-1985 
Defendant  Title 
~  ~~~ 




11.  EC 
13.  France 
15.  U.S. 
16.  France 
17.  Belgium 
18.  Netherlands 
22.  EC 
24.  EC 
34.  U.S. 
43. EC 
45.  U.S. 
48.  EC 
50. EC 
Residual BOP restrictions 
Residual BOP restrictions 
[A 1 NTI 
IA  NTI 
Joint submission: Trade value 
of U.S. withdrawal rights to 
compensate for EC withdrawal 
of poultry concession 
Compensatory taxes on imports 
Import restrictions (proposal for 
retaliation in complaint no. 3) 
DISC tax legislation 
Income tax practices 
Income tax practices 
Income tax practices 
Minimum import prices, etc. 
Mixing requirement for imports 
of  animal feed 
[A 1 TI 
[A 1 NTI 
[A INTI 
[G 1 Sl 
[G 1 SI 
[G 1 Sl 
IG  1 Sl 
[A 1 NTI 
[A 1 NTI 
[G 1 NTI 
Countervailing duty actions 
Internal restraints on imports of 
poultry (“Spin Chill” case) 
Import duty on vitamin B-12 
Export subsidy on wheat flour 
(Subsidies Code complaint) 
Export subsidy on pasta 
(Subsidies Code complaint) 
[A / NT] 
TI 
[A 1 Sl 
































1982 53  US-EC GATT Litigation 
57.  EC 
58.  EC 
66.  U.S. 
67.  U.S. 
70.  U.S. 
77.  U.S. 
80.  U.S. 
Defendant  Title  Complainant  Date 
51.  EC  Export subsidy on poultry  U.S.  1982 
(Subsidies Code complaint) 
[A 1 Sl 
fruit and raisins 
[A 1 Sl 
52.  EC  Production subsidy on canned  us.  I982 
54.  EC  Export subsidy on sugar  U.S.  1982 
(Subsidies Code complaint) 
Preferential tariff on citrus  U.S. 
Treatment of VAT  in price  U.S. 
[A 1 Sl 
[A I T-D] 
calculations (Procurement Code 
complaint) 
Import restrictions on printed  EC 
matter (“Manufacturing 
Clause”) 
[I 1 NTI 
[I 1 NTl 
Export subsidy on wheat flour 
sales to Egypt (Subsidies Code 
complaint) 
[A 1 Sl 
EC 
Tariff reclassification of 
machine-threshed tobacco 
Ban on steel pipe and tube 
imports 
Countervailing duty action on 
wine (Subsidies Code 
complaint) 
[A 1 TI 
[I I NT-D] 












1. In an earlier study using somewhat more inclusive criteria, Hudec (1975, 
278-90),  the author counted 54 lawsuits from 1948 through 1959. Appendix A 
of the present study, based partly on the earlier work and partly on unpublished 
research, counts 80 lawsuits from 1960 to the end of 1985. The introduction to 
Appendix A explains the author’s definition of  a GATT lawsuit. 
2. The EC was created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, but began to function 
only gradually. The key event in the EC’s assumption of GATT legal respon- 
sibility was the 1960-61  Dillon Round trade negotiations in which the GATT 54  Robert E. Hudec 
bindings of EC member country tariffs were replaced by bindings of the EC 
Common External Tariff. The year 1960 provides a convenient breaking point 
for there were no GATT lawsuits that year. 
3. The nine cases not involving either the U.S. or the EC were complaints 
no.  2, 12, 20, 30, 36, 40, 42, 74, and 75. (Note that, here and throughout the 
study, suits against EC member states are treated as EC litigation only when 
the defendant was a member state at the time of the suit.) 
4.  It must be emphasized that this classification  is based on the author’s 
judgment as to the main product interest in the dispute, where such a product 
or product sector can be identified; it does not mean that no other products 
were involved. 
5. Once again it must be emphasized that the classification is based on the 
author’s judgment as to the primary  subject of  the complaint and does not 
mean that no other types of  trade barriers were involved. With  respect to 
discrimination in particular, it should be noted that cases were counted only 
if the complainant made a major legal issue of the fact; several cases involving 
barriers with elements of discrimination were not counted because not enough 
was made of that aspect. 
6. The ten agricultural subsidy cases were complaints no.  28, 32, 33, 46, 48, 
50, 51, 52, 54, and 55. The three other subsidy complaints against the EC were 
complaints no. 16, 17, and 18-the  U.S. complaints about the subsidy effects 
of the “territoriality”  principle in French, Belgian,  and Netherlands income 
tax law. These three complaints were counterclaims in response to the EC’s 
DISC complaint, discussed at notes 18-19  infra. 
7. The complaints involving  the U.S.  countervailing duty law were com- 
plaints no.  26, 34, 44, and 80. 
8. Complaint no. 67. 
9. Complaint no. 15. 
10. Complaints no.  57 and 77. 
11. GATT, BISD, 11th Supp., pp. 100-101  (1963); id.,  13th Supp., pp. 48- 
12. Complaints no. 3 and 4. 
13. The complaint returned to  the GATT agenda ten years later. See  complaint 
14. Complaint no.  6. 
15. The controversy is not listed as a lawsuit in Appendix A. It is described 
16. Complaint no. 11. 
17. Complaint no.  13. 
18. Complaint no.  15. (DISC: Domestic International Sales Corporation) 
19. Complaints no. 16, 17, and 18. Roughly  speaking, the theory was that 
territorial systems permitted the shifting of some export income to “tax ha- 
vens”  and that DISC was merely an equivalent tax haven within the United 
States. 
20. The United States itself had once permitted taxpayers to shift many kinds 
of income to off-shore (in other words, “territorial”)  tax havens, before out- 
lawing this practice in its so-called Subchapter S reforms in the 1960s. 
49 (1965). 
no. 13, discussed at note 17 infra. 
in Hudec (1975, 232). 
21. Section 301, Trade Act of  1974, as amended 19 USC 2411 ef seq. 
22. The seven complaints were complaints no,  21, 22, 24, 27, 31, 37, and 
38. All  but the last were the direct result of private companies filed under 
section 301. 
Since 1979, section 301 proceedings have yielded only four more new GATT 
complaints, all against the EC. They were the wheat flour, pasta, canned fruit, 55  US-EC GATT Litigation 
and citrus cases, complaints no.  48, 50, 52, and 57, discussed at notes 33-36 
infra. One other GATT lawsuit was filed pursuant to section 301 after 1979, 
but it was a 1983  complaint reopening an earlier lawsuit against Japan on leather 
goods (complaint no.  65); it was then extended in 1985 to some other leather 
products.  (The  1985  extension  is  not  listed  as  a  separate  complaint  in 
Appendix A). 
23. Complaints no.  22 and 24. 
24. Complaint no. 34. 
25.  Instances of  actual retaliation include: the Article XIX retaliation in 
response to Australia’s escape clause measures on  autos and shoes (see GATT 
DOCS. C/M/154, -  155, -  156 [1982] ); the Article XIX retaliation in response 
to the  U.S.  escape clause measures on specialty steels (see GATT  DOC. 
L/5524/Add. 15 [ 19841); and the  “lemons and walnuts”  counterretaliation in 
response to the U.S. unilateral retaliation on  pasta products in the citrus case 
(see note 36 infra). Notable threats of retaliation included those directed at the 
1982 U.S. countervailing duty proceeding on carbon steel, at the 1984 U.S. 
Wine Equity Act, and at the 1985-86  proposed legislation to extend the U.S. 
Manufacturing Clause law. 
26.  It is difficult  for a  U.S.  observer to judge whether the Community’s 
posture in these cases was really more belligerent than, say, the average U.S. 
reaction to such situations. It seems so to the author, but U.S. citizens tend 
not to take their own government’s rhetoric very seriously. 
27. Trade Agreements Act of  1979, Title IX, codified as 190 USC 2411 et 
seq. 
28.  “Understanding  Regarding  Notification,  Consultation Dispute Settle- 
ment, and  Surveillance,”  printed  in  GATT,  BISD, 26th  Supp., pp. 210-18 
(1980). 
29. The new panel procedures are described in detail in Hudec (1980). 
30. Complaint no. 43. 
31. Complaint no.  45. 
32. For example, the B-12 problem is still listed as one of the unfair U.S. 
trade practices in the de Clerq memorandum of December 1985, described at 
note 52 infra. 
33. The seven complaints are, respectively, complaints no. 48, 50, 51, 52, 
54, 57, and 58. 
34. The only GATT body with power to make legal rulings is the plenary 
assembly of GATT members, called the Contracting Parties, or its agent, the 
somewhat smaller executive assembly called  the GATT Council. Typically, 
both bodies rule by “accepting” the reports and rulings prepared by the GATT 
panel that hears the case. By tradition, however, decisions of the Contracting 
Parties or the Council are taken by consensus, which means that any country, 
including the defendant, can block the decision to accept a panel report. This 
power to defeat legal rulings is held in check by another tradition that GATT 
bodies should not relitigate cases decided by panels, but should accept all but 
the most clearly erroneous decisions. Prior to 1976, this second tradition had 
been quite strong, with only one panel report ever having been rejected. Since 
then, however, there have been at least 12 instances where acceptance of a 
panel report has been blocked-in  whole or  in part-by  one of the parties. All 
the rulings in the 4 DISC cases (complaints no.  15, 16, 17, and 18) were blocked 
by the losing party-the  first for about five years and the other three perma- 
nently. After that, blocking actions by either the defendant or  a losing plaintiff 
occurred in complaints no. 37, 47, 48, 50, 52, 57, 74, and 80. 
35. See, for example, Brown (1985, 177). 56  Robert E. Hudec 
36. The two retaliations went into effect in a complex series of halting, linked 
steps that stretched over a good part of 1985. The United States raised duties 
to prohibitive levels against pasta (ameliorated somewhat by exchange rate 
behavior), and the Community responded in kind on walnuts and lemons, items 
that represented an equivalent amount of trade. See International Trade Re- 
porter, vol. 2 (Washington,  D.C.:  Bureau of National  Affairs, 1985), pp. 835, 
37. Complaint no. 65. Another leather product was added to the complaint 
38. The five complaints are, respectively, complaints no. 66, 67, 70, 77, and 
39. See note 25 supra. 
40. See note 36 supra. 
41. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2641/84, of 17 September 1984, O.J. (1984) 
L252A.  For one recent discussion of the new instrument, see Van  Bael  and 
Bellis (1985, 197-216). 
42. The subject of the complaint is the United States’ section 337  remedy 
which permits restrictions on imports accused of patent infringement and other 
“unfair” characteristics. 
43. The strike force was created in September 1985 as part of an executive 
branch campaign to counter a tidal  wave of  protectionist  sentiment  in  the 
Congress-another  case, by  the way, of how promises of legal enforcement 
are used to justify support for liberal trade policy positions. For an amusing 
account of the first three months of strike force activities, see “Trade Strike 
Force, Hamstrung by Turf Battles, May Prove Political Liability to Adminis- 
tration,”  Wall St. Journal, 7 January 1986, p. 60. 
For two legislative proposals to fund a war chest to match foreign subsidies, 
see H.R.  3296 and H.R. 3667, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
44. See, for example, the list of pending bills on this one subject alone in 
International  Trade Reporter, vol.  3 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National 
Affairs, 1986) pp. 75-76. 
45. It is a commonplace among trade policy experts that agricultural interests 
have political clout. This political clout is usually observed in the context of 
rent-seeking at home, where agricultural interests appear to have better-than- 
average success in persuading their governments to grant benefits such as price 
or  income supports, protection against import competition, or  export subsidies. 
But that same clout can also be expected to earn better-than-average results 
when agricultural interests believe their export markets are being damaged by 
foreign actions like the CAP, and ask their government to do something about 
it. Clout is clout, whatever the issue. 
46. For a discussion of these trade figures, see Talbot (1985, 39) and also 
Brown (1985, 176). The $9 billion figure was a peak, but U.S. exports in the 
following four years averaged well above $7 billion. 
47. The author has never seen the letter, but he has heard descriptions from 
both EC and U.S. officials whom he has interviewed. As might be expected, 
each side has a somewhat different description of the contents. One side views 
the letter as a U.S. undertaking not to challenge the level of CAP exports as 
they stood in 1979; the other side views it as a more general assurance that 
the U.S. was not seeking to  destroy the  CAP  as such. Given the EC’s knowledge 
that the letter was not to be made public, the EC would not have been justified 
in treating it, whatever its contents, as a meaningful commitment. The letter 
belongs more to the category of symbolic gestures salvaged by the losing side 
on an issue. Its significance here is simply that it was needed at all-that  after 
898, 1131, 1389-90. 
in  1985. 
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having insisted that the 1979 Subsidies Code be limited to a rather tame rep- 
etition and elaboration of existing GATT obligations, the EC was still unable 
to give an unqualified commitment to observe it. 
48. Complaints no. 32 and 33. It is quite interesting to note that the United 
States, usually  an active voice in most GATT legal  proceedings,  sat rather 
conspicuously on  its hands during the litigation phase of this case-up  to the 
end of  1980. It would appear that the highest priority for the U.S. delegation 
during this time was to obtain the EC’s signature on the Subsidies Code, an 
objective that required tender treatment. The United States finally joined the 
fray in the working party consultations that followed the litigation, but by then 
the game had been lost. Indeed, a good case can be made that the subsequent 
wheat flour case was lost on these playing fields as well. 
49. The use of GATT litigation as a peace-keeping device should be interesting 
to social scientists interested in primitive legal societies. One cannot help being 
struck by the similarity between the legal behavior of the GATT governments 
described in this paper and the behavior of primitive  Anglo-Saxon  clans de- 
scribed by Malone (1970,  1): 
The primordial seed from which [legal actions of] both crime and tort were 
to germinate was the blood  feud that was characteristic of any barbaric 
society organized along lines of blood kinship. The defense of the honor of 
the clan by  resort to warfare against the harm-inflicting outsider and his 
entire kin was a traditional practice with roots deep in the need for survival 
of the family unit. The outrage that cried for revenge lay not so much in the 
desire to enforce atonement for the bodily harm inflicted upon the wounded 
family member as in the humiliation that was suffered by his entire kin group. 
The primary object of law was to provide a substitute for the feud; and, as 
would be expected, the remedy that eventually emerged was of a character 
to offer balm where the hurt was deepest-in  the clan’s profound sense of 
indignity. 
50. The problem of discriminatory favors for developing countries has been 
largely taken off  the legal  agenda by  the GATT’s adoption of  the Enabling 
Clause in 1979 at the end of the Tokyo Round, and by the considerable amount 
of ad hoc discrimination now practiced by most other developed countries- 
for example, the current United States  and Canadian policies of granting special 
trade favors to  certain Caribbean nations. As for other legal  problems that 
appeared significant in the 1970s, most have by now been addressed and de- 
bated, usually inconclusively, leaving most complainants with a sense that their 
complaints have achieved as much as possible. In addition, the EC practices 
in question are beginning to acquire the legitimacy  of  existence over time. 
Time, of course, is not a full guarantee of legal security, as was clearly shown 
by the 1982 US.  complaint about long-standing EC citrus preferences (no. 57). 
51. For a  recent article reviewing  the status of  GATT obligations in  the 
Community’s internal law and arguing for a more prominent role, see Peters- 
mann (1985). 
52. The exchange is reported in International Trade Reporter, vol. 2 (Wash- 
ington, D.C.:  Bureau of National Affairs, 1985) pp. 1567-68; id., vol. 3 (19861, 
Another fact which tends to confirm the Ec’s less-than-complete legal com- 
mitment to GATT litigation is that, to the author’s knowledge, all GATT liti- 
gation continues to be handled, not by the EC Commission’s legal staff, but 
by policy officials in the Directorates General responsible for diplomatic rep- 
resentation of the EC on  commercial policy matters. 
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Comment  Per Magnus Wijkman 
Papers on GATT  reform  seem to fall  into one of  three interrelated 
categories. Most debate the need to change the rules of the trade game. 
In this category fall arcane papers on reform of the safeguard clause, 
the intricacies of “graduation,”  and the sophistry of conditional most- 
favored-nation treatment. Others are concerned with the need to change 
the players in the game in order to restore a liberalizing momentum to 
the trade regime. Their authors claim that this momentum is exhausted 
because the existing distribution of bargaining power has deadlocked 
negotiations.  Introducing new issues-or reviving old ones-could at- 
tract new players to the game and change the balance of negotiating 
power. In this category fall discussions in the corridors of power on 
whether to include services, high-tech goods, agriculture, and apparel 
in a new round of negotiations. Finally, we have a few papers discussing 
whether to change the referee in the game. Professor Hudec’s paper 
falls in this exclusive category dealing with dispute settlement proce- 
dures. Its takeoff is his valuable statistical compilation that shows that 
half of the GATT lawsuits between 1960 and 1985 occurred during the 
Per Magnus Wijkman  is head of  the Research Secretariat at the National  Board of 
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1980s. Robert Hudec’s contribution is to explain why litigation has 
become so fashionable today. 
In the tradition of good detective novels, the author first presents 
the most litigious parties and quickly identifies the most frequent plain- 
tiff-the  United  States-and  the most frequent defendant-the  EC. 
One third of  GATT lawsuits  were  between  these  two protagonists. 
Thereafter, Hudec presents the most common subject matter of dis- 
putes: agriculture and nontariff barriers (NTBs). He shows that the EC 
has been sued primarily for its use of subsidies and NTBs to protect 
agriculture while the United States has been sued primarily because 
of its application of countervailing duties. Finally, he explains the mo- 
tives  and the behavior  of  these two major  parties  with  the master 
detective’s psychological insight. 
Hudec presents three explanations for the American administration’s 
recourse to litigation, of which I find the third the most interesting. 
First, he suggests that the intention of American administrations is to 
achieve reciprocity in the term’s new American sense. However, liti- 
gation based on this misinterpretation of reciprocity is doomed to be 
ineffectual.  GATT’s nondiscrimination  principle  ensures the  United 
States of  equal access to a foreign market only in the sense that U.S. 
goods need not pay higher tariffs than other foreign goods pay. It does 
not provide the United States with equal access in the sense that tariff 
levels on American goods exported to, e.g., Brazil, cannot be higher 
on average than tariffs on Brazilian exports to the United States. It is 
this  latter discrepancy  in terms of  bilateral  market  access that has 
concerned the  Americans recently.  If  the  American  objective  is  to 
“level the playing field,” a policy of litigation is flawed. Tariff negoti- 
ations are the appropriate and classical remedy to this problem. 
Consequently and secondly, Hudec explains increased litigation by 
the spread of NTBs. This explanation is based on his explicit assump- 
tion that elimination of NTBs cannot be negotiated through reciprocally 
balanced concessions as can tariffs. I Instead, general rules concerning 
their  use  must be  formulated,  after which litigation can be  used  to 
enforce rule observance. This observation is correct for some types of 
NTBs. However, it does not apply to quantitative restrictions. Gray- 
zone measures, such as “voluntary”  export restraints (VERs), nor- 
mally reflect an out-of-court settlement, by which a country agrees to 
limit  its  exports to a particular  market  in  exchange for part  of  the 
scarcity rents generated by restricting trade. The proliferation of VERs 
is not  an explanation of  litigation but  an alternative  to it.  Hudec’s 
second explanation thus only holds for other NTBs such as subsidies 
and public procurement, and these account for but half of GAIT  lawsuits. 
I. For a different view see L. Alan Winters, “Negotiating the Abolition of Non-Tariff 
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Hudec’s third explanation of the increased frequency of litigation is 
that American administrations have used it as a way to accommodate 
Congress and to placate domestic pressure groups. In particular, liti- 
gation over the common agricultural policy (CAP) has been a means 
to accustom constituencies to unpleasant commercial policy realities 
rather than a way to change these realities. This explanation dominates 
the first two and makes them superfluous. If administrations have been 
aware of their ineffectiveness in modifying the CAP, they have been 
conducting a policy to deceive pressure groups. If unaware, they have 
been engaged in a policy of self-deception.  Hudec seems inclined to 
the former, Machiavellian view. To be successful for any length of time 
such a policy requires tacit collusion between governments, since each 
government must fool its own constituency but not its adversary. The 
policy assumes that pressure groups will not tire of ineffective poli- 
cies-whether  ineffectiveness is intended or  not-and  lobby the admin- 
istration for more effective action but  instead  resign themselves  to 
political realities. 
The U.S.  propensity to go to court in  order to placate domestic 
interests has increased international trade tensions. Hudec shows how 
the rash of  litigation in the 1980s results from increased U.S. aggres- 
siveness and the EC’s adoption of a counterpunching strategy.  The 
“trade hostilities”  in 1986 occasioned by Spain’s and Portugal’s mem- 
bership in the EC support this thesis. Towards the end, Hudec’s paper 
portrays the two commercial superpowers standing “clad in full legal 
armor” anticipating “bigger and better GATT litigation.” This prospect 
fills an observer from a small country with fear of being crushed under 
the heavy armor of falling giants. It is often claimed that small countries 
need the protection of legal institutions more than large countries do. 
This observation implies that small countries can be expected to use 
litigation more often than large countries do. Hudec’s statistics do not 
bear this out. Big countries sue more often than small countries. Big 
countries sue other big countries. When small countries sue they also 
sue big countries. This reflects the obvious fact that countries litigate 
when their bargaining power is too small to negotiate a satisfactory 
out-of-court settlement. But it also suggests that large countries are 
more confident than small countries that litigation will provide satis- 
faction. This is a worrisome conclusion. 
A first cause for concern is that the strategy attributed to the United 
States by Hudec risks overloading GATT’s dispute settlement capacity. 
This capacity is already insufficient and would become even less ac- 
cessible to small countries whose needs for dispute settlement may be 
greater, though less dramatic, than the two superpowers’ needs. 
A second cause for concern is that this strategy risks discrediting 
the dispute settlement mechanism. Its basic purpose is to settle dis- 61  US-EC GATT Litigation 
putes, not to appear to be  settling disputes.  Dispute settlement has 
taken on the characteristics of a Norman jousting tournament in which 
the battles are for the benefit of the spectators rather than for the spoils 
of war. While recognizing that these ritual jousts may help avoid general 
trade wars, one still may ask whether it is not an abuse of the dispute 
settlement system. What will happen when a real dispute arises and 
needs to be settled? This prospect worries small countries, which lack 
negotiating strength to fall back on in bilateral dispute settlement. It 
should also worry  the EC and the  U.S.  in  case either should need 
conciliation to settle a major dispute. 
Therefore, let me conclude with some reflections on the real culprit: 
a flawed dispute settlement mechanism. The tendency to litigate for 
the sake of litigation rather than to seek a remedy cannot be forbidden. 
However, it can be discouraged by measures which increase the costs 
of litigation. Displeasure with an adversary’s action should not be suf- 
ficient cause to go to court. In addition, the outcome of a lawsuit should 
be unpredictable. If predictable, both parties have strong incentives to 
reach an out-of-court settlement provided that the dispute settlement 
mechanism is credible. The concurrence of a large number of lawsuits 
and a high predictability of outcome indicates that the mechanism is 
being used for other purposes than dispute settlement. This will reduce 
its credibility in the long run. 
How can one increase the risks to litigants of litigation? One way is 
to reduce members’ ability to influence the outcome. Their influence 
is both indirect via the selection of panel members and direct by vetoing 
the Council’s adoption of a panel’s report. Members cannot only “pack 
the jury” but also “hang the  judge” and large countries tend to exercise 
this power more often than other GATT members. Having a number 
of  standing panels,  sitting for four-year periods, would increase the 
independence and continuity of  the panel  mechanism.  Not allowing 
parties to a dispute to vote on Council adoption of a report (the “GATT- 
minus-two” formula) would diminish the predictability of the outcome. 
These are minor changes. Major changes are not possible in the GATT 
system. The GATT contract depends on self-enforcement for compli- 
ance with its basic principles. 
Comment  J. P.  Hayes 
I would like to pick up Dr. Wijkman’s remark, that “some trade dis- 
putes are serious.”  It struck me that one of the most serious disputes, 
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over the possibility of U.S. countervailing duties on EC steel in 1982, 
does not qualify for inclusion under Professor Hudec’s definition of 
GATT lawsuits (althoiigh the Community raised the matter in the GATT 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties). 
Is it the case that the GATT dispute settlement procedure leads to 
concentration on the particular  points at issue, and does not allow 
wider trade-offs? Whatever the answer, US-EC trade disputes typically 
have to be seen in a broader context of  transatlantic  relations.  For 
example, on the Washington view of the  1982 steel dispute, Levine 
reports : 
At a time when harmony was needed,  US-EC  relations were bad 
and seemingly getting worse. The Soviet Union was in Afghanistan, 
Poland was in turmoil, and the proposed stationing of additional U.S. 
missiles in  Europe and President Reagan’s vocal anti-communism 
were testing the alliance. . . . 
Washington was also concerned about undermining the EC. Steel 
was, along with the Common Agricultural Policy, one of the under- 
pinnings of the Community.* 
This case suggests the question: Why do some trade disputes lead to 
GATT “lawsuits,”  under the definition, and others not? 
Professor Hudec suggests that  the Gatt dispute  settlement proce- 
dures perform a useful political function in the U.S. On the Community 
side, there are feelings of  irritation which  I  think  are by no means 
entirely synthetic. Thus, in the Commission one hears complaints that 
the U.S. had been “testing GATT dispute settlement to destruction.” 
One complaint on the Community side is that, given the separation 
of  powers between the executive and legislative branches, the U.S. 
cannot be relied on to comply with GATT findings. (Reference is made 
to the U.S.  manufacturing clauses and the Wine Equity Act; also to 
the delay in replacing DISC.) The Community may feel vulnerable not 
only because it has policies which are subject to attack but also because 
the strength of the executives in Community countries removes a plau- 
sible excuse for noncompliance. 
In fact, I suggest that we have a curious game here, in which each 
side wishes to use the dispute settlement mechanism to restrain the 
other from doing certain things, but wishes to avoid being restrained 
itself.  (The question  why  governments  wish to follow  some of  the 
policies to which they are attached raises wider issues, which I will 
just touch on later.) 
1. For the issues as seen from the Community’s side, see Frank Benyon and Jacques 
Bourgeois,  “The  European Community-United  States Steel Arrangements”  Common 
Market Law Review 21, no. 2 (June  1984): 305-54. 
2. Michael  K. Levine, Inside International  Trade Policy  Formulation: A  History of 
the 1982 US-EC Steel Arrangements  (New York, etc.: Praeger,  1985). 37-38. 63  US-EC GATT Litigation 
Another aspect of the Community’s attitude is dislike of the idea that 
GATT panels might in effect make law by establishing  precedent^.^ In 
this view, rules for international trade should be established by nego- 
tiation, and the GATT dispute settlement procedures can only lead to 
firm conclusions when  the relevant rules have already been  agreed 
upon. The problem then is that in important areas-subsidies  and coun- 
tervailing  duties being a notable example-the  rules have  not been 
agreed upon. Professor Hudec’s paper might be read as suggesting that 
the arrangements are reasonably satisfactory as they are; but in some 
quarters, at least, there seems to be a felt need for improvement. The 
proposals I have seen might be roughly grouped in five categories. 
First, there are what might be roughly called administrative improve- 
ments-for  example, time limits and increase of the professionalism of 
GATT panels.  However, such changes might still leave the outcome 
subject to negotiation between the parties. 
A more far-reaching change, which perhaps goes beyond the bound- 
aries of this category, is that the last word on a dispute should rest 
with the panel rather than with the GATT Council. This (like the pro- 
posal that the parties to the dispute should abstain in the final vote on 
the adoption of the panel report) appears to move dispute settlement 
nearer  to a judicial process.  I am not  clear whether  this would  be 
acceptable, at any rate to the Community; and in any case the problem 
of securing compliance would remain. 
The second category is strengthening of the machinery for monitoring 
compliance. The problem of sanctions would remain. I understand that 
the GATT has been very reluctant to authorize retaliation against coun- 
tries found to be in breach of GATT rules: there is a clear danger that 
the “remedy”  could be as bad as, or worse than, the disease. Thus, 
even with strengthened monitoring, dispute settlement might continue 
to depend on moral suasion. 
Third, it has been suggested that, where a case turns on a disputed 
interpretation of the GATT, the panel should make recommendations 
for the revision or interpretation of the relevant provision.  Because 
any such revision or  interpretation might alter the previously negotiated 
balance of  concessions, the issue should be sent to the appropriate 
committee or a special working party for neg~tiation.~  A possible prob- 
3. The present dispute settlement process has been described by de Lacharriere: “The 
common purpose  of all  the  procedures for the  settlement  of disputes is  not, strictly 
speaking, to ensure compliance with the law but  to arrive at settlements acceptable to 
the parties concerned. Hence it is not a matter of  sanctioning a breach of a rule, still 
less of punishing it, but of restoring the balance of advantage in trade between  the parties” 
(Guy Ladreit de Lacharrikre, “Case for a Tribunal to Assist in Settling Trade Disputes,” 
The World Economy, 8, no. 4, [December 19851 340). 
4. Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, Truding for  Growth, Policy Analyses 
in  International  Economics no 1 I  (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International  Eco- 
nomics, 1985); cited in Gardner Patterson and Eliza Patterson, “Importance of a GATT 
Review in the New Negotiations,”  The World Economy 9, no. 2, (June 1986):153-69. 64  Robert E. Hudec 
lem with this is that issues would be dealt with one at a time, thus 
giving little or no opportunity for trades. It may be better to continue 
the practice  of  storing up disputed  issues to be negotiated  simulta- 
neously in a GATT round. 
Fourth, there are suggestions that GATT rules should be incorporated 
into national  law,  so that private  parties could invoke them  in  the 
national courts. I am inclined to doubt whether this is in the area of 
practical politics.s 
Fifth (and going further afield), it might be said to be a function of 
the GATT to prevent governments from doing things which they ought 
not to want to do in any case. Public education has a part to play here. 
In the United Kingdom, cost of protection studies seem to be having 
a certain effect. (In France, on the other hand, a senior official told 
me that no such studies have been made, and that there is no demand 
for them).  In  any case, we  should  not be overoptimistic about the 
influence of economists. 
It  might  be  more  effective to  build  up  countervailing power  by 
strengthening the machinery for consulting consumer, user, and im- 
porter interests. However, governments may be reluctant. At present, 
they can secure political benefit by conferring advantages on producer 
groups, and those who bear the costs do not appear to be particularly 
aggrieved. With greater and more balanced consultation, someone would 
be aggrieved in the end-the  producers if  the upshot were to withold 
protection, and the consumers, other users, or importers if protection 
were granted over their objections. Nevertheless, more extensive con- 
sultations on matters of trade policy would be highly desirable in the 
general interest.6 
I live in hope that someone may have proposals that will solve all 
the problems. 
5. “1 would propose that the main international effort should be directed to securing 
more perfect national justiciability of the personal rights which it is the ultimate function 
of international agreements to protect. Adjudication procedures at the international level- 
determinations by GATT panels, for example-are  procedures of the executive branch 
which any truly independent national judiciary should have the full right to ignore” (Jan 
Tumlir, “Conceptions  of the International Economic and Legal Order,”  [book review 
article], The World Economy, 8,  no.  I  (March 1985): 87). 
6. I must confess that I had not, and still have not, thought out the implications of the 
idea that individuals might have access to the GATT dispute settlement proceedings: nor 
of the different suggestion that third parties should be encouraged and helped to complain 
(Trade Policies for  a Better Future: Proposals for  Action, Report of an Independent 
Group under the Chairmanship of  Fritz Leutwiler [Geneva: GATT Secretariat, 19851, 
46-47;  cited in Patterson and Patterson, op.  cit.). Also relevant to parts of this discussion 
may be: Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,  “International  and European  Foreign Trade Law: 
GATT Dispute Settlement against the EEC,” Common Market Law Review, 22 (1985): 
441-87. 